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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether involuntary CEO replacements pay off by improving firm prospects. We 
find CEO successors’ acquisition investments to be associated with significantly higher 
shareholder gains relative to their predecessors and the average CEO. This improvement in post-
turnover acquisition performance appears to be a function of board independence, hedge fund 
ownership, and the new CEO’s relative experience. CEO successors also create sizeable 
shareholder value by reversing prior investments through asset disposals and discontinuing 
operations and by employing more efficient investment strategies. Our evidence suggests that 
firing a CEO pays off.  
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 The chief executive officer (CEO) and the top management team are typically viewed as critical 
to the success or failure of companies. As it is not uncommon for top executives to make value 
destroying decisions, the role of internal control mechanisms, such as the board of directors, is to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders by replacing poorly performing incumbent CEOs with new 
ones. In a recent paper, Kaplan and Minton (2012) report that involuntary dismissals of top 
executives as well as the performance-turnover sensitivity have increased significantly over the 
past decade.1 Although boards have become accustomed to CEO dismissals, it is still controversial 
whether they have become adept at making the dismissals pay off. Existing research has gauged 
the effectiveness of CEO replacements by examining whether post-turnover firm performance 
changes. While some studies document significant improvements in terms of conventional 
performance metrics such as operating earnings and stock returns, attributed to the appointment of 
new CEO successors (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004), others find 
evidence to the contrary (Wiersema, 2002). Despite the compelling evidence of a strong inverse 
relation between the quality of acquisition investments and the likelihood of subsequent 
disciplinary turnover (Lehn and Zhao, 2006), to-date it remains unknown whether CEO successors 
improve firm prospects through superior acquisition and other investment decisions relative to the 
ones carried out by their dismissed predecessors.  
 Since poor investment results tend to have an adverse effect on corporate performance and have 
been identified as key drivers of forced CEO turnovers, corporate investment decisions of new 
CEOs relative to their fired predecessors provide an ideal ground to gain fundamental insights into 
the corporate performance-resuscitating role of CEO replacements.2 Moreover, M&A deals offer 
a unique platform to examine whether CEO replacements improve corporate decision making. 
Thus, a sample of forced turnovers preceded by acquisition investments with directly measurable 
                                                 
1 For other research focusing on the relationship between corporate performance and forced CEO turnover see Coughlan and 
Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), and Weisbach (1988).  
2 The acrimonious departure of Hewlett-Packard’s then-CEO Carly Fiorina in 2005 for instance was reportedly attributed to a great 
extent to the apparent failure of the HP-Compaq merger which Fiorina led in 2001. Shares of HP jumped 6.9 percent on the day of 
the news. Fiorina was replaced by Mark Hurd, an outsider with great operational experience, who not only managed to make the 
Compaq merger work, but also re-focused the corporate strategy of HP and grew the company threefold through a series of 
successful acquisitions until he stepped down in 2010. 
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outcomes allows us to examine the overarching question whether shareholders are better off with 
new CEO appointments by focusing mainly on acquisition decisions carried out by CEO 
successors relative to their dismissed counterparts. In addition, we investigate how forced 
turnovers affect the efficiency of the firm’s overall investment (i.e., including CAPEX and R&D) 
as well as the performance of its auxiliary (divestment) corporate strategies. 
 Using a sample of M&A deals between 1989 and 2016 taking place during a 10-year window 
surrounding CEO turnover events in publicly listed US companies, we find that pre-turnover deals 
consummated within a 5-year window by CEOs that are subsequently forced out generate 
significant losses for acquirers. Specifically, they are associated with an average (median) 
abnormal return of -0.88% (-0.79%) around the acquisition announcement, corresponding to a 
wealth destruction of $105 ($90) million for the average-size firm. In public acquisitions this loss 
increases to an average (median) -3.53% (-2.92%) while surprisingly even private deals fail to 
generate gains. This negative abnormal return is equivalent to $393 ($325) million shareholder 
value loss. Pre-turnover deals also fare significantly worse than matched control deals completed 
by CEOs that keep their jobs or leave voluntarily. Collectively, these results are consistent with the 
view that weak deal making is a primary cause of CEO dismissals. 
 The central finding of this study is that when newly appointed CEOs carry out acquisitions, 
within 5-years following dismissals, they create significant shareholder gains (1.59%); a 2.47% 
improvement relative to previous deals made by their dismissed predecessors. CEO dismissals also 
result in new acquisitions with sizeable synergistic gains (2.05%), contrary to pre-turnover deals 
that generate combined losses (-0.76%). In multivariate and propensity score matching tests, where 
we control for firm and deal-level characteristics, the superior acquisition performance of new 
CEOs over their predecessors’ as well as that of CEO successors pertaining to voluntary turnovers 
persists. In addition, when we match deals consummated by dismissed CEOs to similar deals in 
terms of performance and other characteristics from the universe of M&As irrespective of 
turnovers, our evidence reveals that the documented improved performance is because new CEOs 
carry out better deals than the average top executive and not due to mean reversion. We also find 
that CEO successors attain significantly higher post-acquisition stock and operating performance 
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than their dismissed predecessors. The typical CEO successor in our sample generates an aggregate 
gain of 2.92% from acquisition announcements over 5 years, which translates in a $273 million 
increase in shareholder value for the average-size firm, exceeding more than tenfold the implied 
costs associated with forced turnovers as reported in Taylor (2010).These post-turnover value-
added investment decisions advocate that the firing of CEOs pays off for shareholders despite the 
concern of many boards that such decisions may be costly to investors due to severance packages 
and golden parachute payments for departing executives.3 In sum, our evidence suggests that 
CEOs should be dismissed when they underperform and provides support to the practice of 
aligning executive pay policies with performance to reduce the burden from CEO dismissals.4  
 While our results demonstrate that bringing in a new chief executive tends to enhance corporate 
performance through better investment decisions, we also examine whether corporate governance 
and the presence of large external shareholders may affect the magnitude of this upturn.5 Our 
evidence shows that the acquisition performance differential between new and dismissed CEOs 
increases economically with the degree of board independence. Specifically, an interquartile 
change in board independence is linked to an increase in acquisition performance improvement by 
2 percentage points. Furthermore, we examine whether external blockholders and hedge funds that 
may be better positioned to monitor firm’s management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008) add pressure on corporate directors to replace poorly performing 
CEOs (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997) with better replacements to boost investment performance 
turnarounds.6 Consistent with the view that external monitoring by hedge funds, not only 
                                                 
3 For example, when CEOs at Hewlett-Packard, Bank of New York Mellon, Burger King, and Yahoo! were asked to step down in 
2011, they walked away with severance packages that cost shareholders a combined $60 million. And when Léo Apotheker stepped 
down as CEO at Hewlett-Packard, he walked away with $13.2 million in cash and stock severance. 
4 This is in line with many successful activist shareholders, such as Carl Icahn and Kirk Kerkorian, who have been strong advocates 
of more CEO firings and regulatory changes that need to be made in order for companies to become better corporate citizens by 
adding value to all stakeholders and serving society. 
5 Weisbach (1988) and Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996) show that boards with more outside directors are more likely to 
dismiss poorly performing CEOs. Huson, et al. (2004) find that the post-turnover improvement in a firm’s profitability increases 
with the percentage of outsiders on the board and Jenter and Lewellen (2014) provide evidence that stronger boards are more 
effective in dealing with negative stock performance shocks after replacing their CEO. 
6 Hedge funds tend to buy stakes in companies and agitate for changes in the form of management shakeups, divestitures, and 
buybacks. In its aggressive form, hedge fund activism may aim to put public pressure on management to implement radical changes 
in corporate strategy or corporate governance. Brav, et al. (2008) find that disciplinary action in the form of CEO turnover against 
poorly performing executives is more likely following activist targeting by hedge funds. 
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precipitates CEO turnover but also considerably enhances the quality of new CEO hiring decisions, 
our results show that the existence of a hedge fund blockholder is associated with the appointment 
of a CEO successor that achieves a 3.35 percentage points higher acquisition return improvement.  
 We also examine directly the impact of CEO-level characteristics that have been linked to 
management quality on the post-turnover change in acquisition performance and find that hiring a 
more experienced successor relative to the old CEO results in a more pronounced post-turnover 
acquisition performance improvement. Specifically, an interquartile change in managerial 
experience-difference between the two CEOs yields higher acquirer gains by 2.08 percentage 
points. This finding suggests that that investment outcomes can be partly a function of the chief 
executive’s prior experience. 
 Although our primary focus is to assess the impact of CEO turnover on corporate investment 
quality through M&A stock returns and operating performance, we also examine CEO successors’ 
general managerial ability to improve firm outcomes in terms of total net investment efficiency 
gains. Our findings, based on a measure of investment that diverges from the firm’s growth 
opportunities, show that new CEOs generally adopt more efficient investment strategies than their 
dismissed predecessors. We also find that even CEOs that do not undertake acquisition investments 
in the post-turnover period (non-acquisitive successors) appear to employ more optimal investment 
strategies than their predecessors. Finally, consistent with previous evidence (see e.g., Weisbach, 
1995) we find that besides engaging in better acquisitions, new CEOs create significant 
shareholder gains by systematically reversing prior poorly performing investments through asset 
disposals and the termination of non-performing operations.  
 Overall, our study contributes to the M&A and CEO turnover literature in several important 
ways. In relation to previous research identifying poor investment decisions as a key factor of 
forced CEO turnovers (Lehn and Zhao, 2006), we document that CEO firings are actually 
beneficial to shareholders since their successors pursue superior investment and auxiliary 
corporate strategies. While previous studies (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, et al., 2004) report 
turnarounds following forced CEO turnovers, our work demonstrates that this improvement is 
mainly driven by CEO successors adopting more optimal organic (CAPEX and R&D) and 
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inorganic (M&A) growth strategies. Further, from a corporate governance perspective, our 
findings highlight that learning from past mistakes plays an important role in turning around 
corporate fortunes through more effective CEO selection and/or monitoring of CEO investment 
decisions. Consistent with the view that the identification and selection of the CEO is among the 
most important functions of the board of directors (Khurana, 2004), our evidence adds to the 
existing literature by showing that corporate governance can exert a positive influence on 
investment outcomes (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007) through the appointment of more skilled 
chief executives. Moreover, this study contributes to the organization theory and strategic 
management literature advocating that poorly performing firms should focus on hiring new 
executives with the ability and skills to achieve turnarounds (see, e.g., Hofer, 1980; Schwartz and 
Menon, 1985; Chen and Hambrick, 2012; Donatiello, Larcker, and Tayan, 2018). Finally, our 
evidence shows that external monitoring by large shareholders and, in particular, hedge funds, not 
only triggers CEO turnover (Brav, et al., 2008), but drastically enhances the quality of new CEO 
hiring decisions and firm post-turnover performance.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I, describes the data and reports the sample 
statistics. Section II examines whether acquisition performance improves following forced 
turnovers and Section III investigates the drivers behind the acquisition performance change. 
Section IV presents evidence on the long-run post-acquisition stock return and operating 
performance differences between new and old CEOs. Section V examines the investment 
efficiency of new CEOs relative to their dismissed predecessors. Section VI compares pre- and 
post-turnover divestment strategies. Section VII reports results from robustness and additional 
tests. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.  
I. Data and Sample Statistics 
A. Acquisition and Turnover Samples  
 The sample of merger and acquisition announcements is from Thomson Financial SDC and 
deals are announced between 1989 and 2016. Acquirers are US firms listed in NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ with data in CRSP and Compustat and targets are public, private, and subsidiary US or 
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foreign firms. Both, the market capitalization of acquirers and the transaction value are equal to or 
larger than $10 million (in 2011 dollars). The target-to-acquirer relative size is at least 1% and the 
acquirer’s ownership of the target is less than 10% prior to the merger announcement and more 
than 50% following completion. Imposing these criteria leads to an initial sample of around 
nineteen thousand deals.  
 CEO turnovers are identified from SEC proxy statements (filings include, but are not limited 
to, DEF 14A, DEF 14C, and PRE 14A) and annual/current reports (for example, forms 10-K and 
8-K) and are complemented and verified by searches in LexisNexis. This information is available 
in EDGAR from 1994 and therefore the sample of CEO turnovers spans from 1994 to 2011. We 
require that the departed CEO completed at least one acquisition in the 5-year period preceding a 
turnover announcement. We retain turnover events where the cumulative relative size of deals 
consummated by the departed CEO within a 5-year window prior to the turnover announcement 
date is equal to or larger than 10%. This requirement ensures that CEOs make significantly large 
acquisition investments prior to their departure. We obtain 2,386 turnovers corresponding to 4,949 
pre-turnover deals that satisfy the above criteria. CEO successors consummate an additional 1,627 
deals within a 5-year post-turnover window. To partition the turnover sample in forced and 
voluntary we follow the methodology outlined in Parrino (1997) and Huson, et al. (2004), based 
on searches in LexisNexis around the turnover announcement.7 In addition, since our main analysis 
focuses on the investment decisions and performance of new CEOs relative to their predecessors 
we remove cases where the firm delists around the turnover.  
 Following this classification process we obtain a final turnover sample of 226 forced and 1,420 
voluntary turnovers, corresponding to 5,075 acquisition deals carried out by departed (3,448) and 
successor (1,627) CEOs within a 5-year pre- and post-turnover window, respectively. The fraction 
of forced-to-total turnovers (14%) is similar to the 16% reported in Huson, et al. (2004). The six 
                                                 
7 Details of this classification process can be found in the Appendix. 
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main industries (consumer, finance, high tech, healthcare, manufacturing, and other) are 
adequately represented within both subsets.8 
 To avoid sample selection problems, we do not impose a minimum tenure requirement for the 
CEO successor. Instead, we examine the investment behavior and performance of all successors 
up to 5-years post-turnover or until they left the firm, if this occurs earlier, although the great 
majority of them remain in their position for at least 5 years. For some of our tests we also utilize 
a “no-turnover” control sample. This consists of 1,152 turnover cases where a CEO is not replaced 
within 5 years after completing acquisition deals with aggregate relative size equal to or greater 
than 10%. This control group comprises of 2,617 deals. 
 Table I presents general turnover sample information. Panel A shows the constituent subsets of 
forced and voluntary turnovers. For 87 of the 226 forced departures the announcements and/or 
news reports indicate that the CEO was forced-out/fired. In 11 cases policy differences/conflicts 
are explicitly quoted as the cause of dismissal. From the remaining 128 cases, in 24 poor CEO 
performance was cited as reason for the turnover while the rest were originally classified as 
tentatively forced and have been subsequently verified as involuntary based on the process 
discussed earlier. With regards to voluntary turnovers, around one third (454) were due to 
retirement. CEOs left to accept another position in 65 cases and resigned, but did not move to 
another firm, in 193 cases. Further, 154 voluntary turnovers were due to normal/planned 
succession and 43 due to poor health/death. The Other Voluntary subset comprises of 201 cases 
where the CEO steps down as a result of acquiring another company (122), to pursue other interests 
(63), as part of a restructuring process (8), separation of chairman and CEO position (5) or a spinoff 
(3). In all the above cases, we find sufficient evidence pointing to a voluntary departure. Finally, 
the voluntary sample includes 310 cases where we were unable to identify an unambiguous reason 
for the turnover. Panel B reports information on the departed CEOs destination. The great majority 
                                                 
8 The reason our turnover sample is somewhat smaller compared to some other recent studies (see, e.g., Jenter and Kanaan, 2015), 
is mainly because the nature of our investigation requires that CEO turnovers are preceded by acquisitions. Moreover, our sample 
consists of fewer forced turnovers than in Lehn and Zhao (2006) since they include cases where the acquirer does not survive post-
turnover. They also define forced turnovers more broadly than Huson, et al. (2004), which we follow in this study. Our results, 
however, are robust to alternative CEO turnover classification schemes as highlighted in Section VII. 
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of forced turnover cases are associated with CEOs that left the firm.9 On the contrary, it appears 
that most of the CEOs that leave voluntarily are normally retained within the firm in either a Top 
3 management or other position, or in the board of directors. Panel C reports the distribution of 
turnover cases for the three sub-periods.  
[Table I about here] 
B. Forced Turnover Sample Statistics 
 Figure 1 illustrates the schematic representation of our research design in the context of the 
forced CEO turnovers, which are the central focus of our analysis. As per our sample selection 
criteria, in each of the 226 cases the departed CEO has consummated acquisition deals with 
aggregate target-to-acquirer relative size of at least 10%. The CEO successor has completed at 
least one control acquisition (with relative size greater than 1%) in 110 cases. The remaining 116 
successors have not carried out acquisition investments since taking office and up to a 5-year 
period. In order to test whether investment performance improves subsequent to forced CEO 
turnovers, our initial tests concentrate on the 110 cases where both replaced CEOs and their 
successors carry out acquisitions. However, we also examine the investment efficiency, divestment 
behavior of non-acquisitive CEO successors and firm’s long-run performance in Sections IV, V, 
and VI. Figure 2 shows the distribution of transactions for the sample of 110 forced turnovers 
across the 5-year pre- and post-turnover periods. New CEOs complete less deals (194) than 
departed ones (270) whereas most of their investment activity is concentrated in the years t-2 and 
t-3 relative to the turnover year.  
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
  
 Table II reports statistics on key characteristics of departed and successor CEOs and 
information about the firm’s board of directors (BoD) and ownership profile for the sample of 
                                                 
9 In eleven cases the deposed CEO appears to be retained in a top 3 management position. In seven of those the CEO was the 
founder, whilst in the rest they left within a year or retained a management position in order to assist in the transition. 
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forced turnovers described above. Panel A provides statistics on CEO characteristics. Newly 
appointed CEOs tend to be younger than their predecessors by 2.3 years while the average tenure 
of old CEOs is 7 years.10 Further, 54.5% of successors are outside appointments with the rest 
accounting for internal successions. CEO curriculum information is hand-collected from the 
Marquis Who’s Who database and complemented with searches in SEC filings, Forbes Profiles, 
and Bloomberg Business Week (Executive Profiles). CEO Experience (years) is measured around 
the turnover event in question for both CEOs and shows that new chief executives have on average 
less prior CEO experience (4 years) relative to their predecessors (8.5 years). Yet, an untabulated 
finding suggests that predecessor CEOs prior experience around their appointment was typically 
only 1.4 years. Accordingly, the indicator variable Experienced CEO at appointment reveals that 
corporate boards tend to install a new chief executive with prior CEO experience in 58.2% of the 
cases, a significantly higher likelihood than for formerly appointed predecessor CEOs (22.95%). 
This is in line with anecdotal evidence that more recently firms display a preference for chief 
executives with prior CEO experience (see, e.g., Lublin, 2005; Karlsson and Neilson, 2009; 
Graffin, Carpenter, and Boivie, 2011). It may also be linked with a life cycle effect where corporate 
boards are more likely to select a generalist/experienced CEO successor to handle the large 
complexity of a more mature firm.11 In addition, following Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), we 
use a finance degree indicator to capture an aspect of CEO quality proxied by his education. We 
find that new CEOs are more likely to have finance-oriented education relative to their 
predecessors implying that corporate boards tend to favor chief executives with finance degrees 
when faced with top management replacement decisions.  
[Table II about here] 
 Panel B reports board of directors and ownership information prior to the turnover event. 
Similar to Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) we classify directors into three categories; insiders, 
                                                 
10 Successors’ tenure is not reported as we only trace them up to 5 years post-turnover due to our research design. The average 
CEO’s tenure within this 5-year window is 4.76 years.  
11 CEO experience is one of the ingredients of the generalist CEO index in Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013). 
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grey, and outsiders.12 BoD independence is the percentage of outsiders relative to the total directors 
siting on the board of the firm as reported in the proxy statement prior to the turnover 
announcement.13 The typical board in our sample comprises 67% independent directors. Of all the 
firm’s directors at the turnover, 60.4% have remained unchanged since the appointment of the old 
CEO. This implies a rather modest change in the typical board’s composition considering that the 
average tenure of directors at S&P 500 companies is around 8 years Spencer Stuart (2014) while 
the average tenure for predecessor CEOs in our sample is 7 years. Moreover, in 44.2% of the cases, 
the chairman of the BoD has remained the same since the hiring of the old CEO while the post-to-
pre turnover difference in the share of independent directors is only around five percentage points. 
Thus, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that predecessor CEOs in our sample were typically 
replaced by a rather similar board to the one that originally hired them.  
 Further, Panel B also reports blockholder information. An external blockholder owing at least 
5% of the company’s shares and identified from SEC filings is reported in more than 70% of the 
cases which is consistent with other studies (see, e.g., Huson, et al., 2004; Edmans and Manso, 
2011). Pre-turnover hedge fund blockholdings are identified in almost a third of the cases. 
Blockholders are classified as hedge funds if they are quoted as hedge funds or offer such funds 
based on extensive searches in news articles retrieved from LexisNexis and other sources around 
the date of the corresponding SEC filling. In Section III, we further examine the influence of CEO 
attributes, BoD composition, and ownership structure on post-turnover investment improvement. 
 Table III reports deal and acquirer summary statistics for the sample of forced turnovers. 
Column 1 (Pre all) reports figures for the full sample of 226 forced turnover cases where departed 
CEOs completed 539 deals. Columns 2 (Pre) and 3 (Post), show figures for the group of 110 cases 
where both the old and new CEOs carried out acquisition investments. This sample comprises of 
                                                 
12 Inside directors are current employees of the firm. Grey directors are former employees, non-employee business associates 
(consultants, lawyers, or financiers) where conflicts of interest might arise, or relatives of other inside directors. All other non-
employee members are classified as outside directors. 
13 We focus on DEF 14A and DEF 14C forms. However, we also collect directors’ information from 10-K reports if the proxy 
statement is issued more than a year prior the turnover announcement in order to capture the board composition that is most relevant 
to the CEO dismissal. For six cases where there is no proxy statement or annual report available within a reasonable period of time 
prior to the turnover announcement, we obtain board information from the first statement following the turnover announcement. 
Removing those cases does not materially affect our results.  
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270 deals made by CEO predecessors and 194 by their successors. The table also reports statistics 
for a control group of 6,959 deals. Of those, 4,342 took place within a 5-year period following or 
preceding 1,420 voluntary turnovers and the remaining 2,617 deals are linked to the “no-turnover” 
group where the CEOs keep their jobs for five years after carrying out deals with cumulative 
relative size of 10% (1,152 cases).  
[Table III about here] 
 Columns 2 and 3, show that new CEOs typically carry out fewer acquisition deals than their 
predecessors although this can be driven by the 10% cumulative relative size criterion requirement 
imposed for pre-turnover deals.14 Further, CEO successors make less public acquisitions than their 
predecessors and tend to substitute stock for cash as the post-minus-pre pure stock (cash) 
differential is -34.1% (19.4%). Evidently, new CEOs refrain from offering stock to acquire targets 
and have lower market-to-book values which can be attributed to lower market valuation realized 
under the helm of their predecessors. Further, successor CEOs enter a more mature firm as 
suggested by the lower Tobin’s q. We also find no significant differentials in the share of tender 
offers, focusing, and cross-border deals carried out by the CEO counterparts, neither in the offered 
premia.  
II. Does Acquisition Performance Improve Following Forced CEO Turnovers?  
A. Univariate Analysis of Acquirer CARs 
 In this subsection, we examine acquisition abnormal return differences between deals 
completed by outgoing CEOs and their successors during the 5-year windows preceding and 
following forced turnover events, respectively. Table IV presents the results for a sample of 464 
deals announced around 110 forced turnovers. Panel A reports 3-day abnormal returns (CAR) to 
acquirers as well as synergy gains using the acquiring and target firms’ market capitalization 
                                                 
14 The documented drop in acquisition activity may also be linked to the fact that CEOs tend to invest less at the beginning of their 
tenure (Pan, Wang, and Weisbach, 2016). Consistent with the evidence that CEO successors following forced turnovers are less 
acquisitive, in untabulated results we find that successor CEOs appear to also take more time (22 months) to lead a new deal 
compared to the voluntary subset (18 months). We thank an anonymous referee suggesting this. 
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weighted combined return as in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). The 270 deal announcements 
taking place prior to involuntary turnovers generate negative and statistically significant mean 
(median) CARs of -0.88% (-0.79%). A CAR of this magnitude appears to be substantially lower 
than the positive abnormal returns reported in other studies for mixed baskets of public and private 
deals.15 This corresponds to wealth destruction of $98 million for the average-size acquirer in the 
pre-turnover period. The negative acquirer return is primarily driven by acquisitions of publicly 
listed targets which are subject to an average (median) CAR of -3.53% (-2.92%) which 
corresponds to a striking $393 ($325) million loss for the average-size acquirer. Interestingly, 
dismissed CEOs also fail to increase shareholder value in private deals although such type of 
acquisitions are typically linked to large gains for acquiring shareholders (see, e.g., Fuller, et al., 
2002; Faccio, et al., 2006). Further, combined returns reveal that pre-turnover deals fail to generate 
positive synergistic gains. Collectively, these findings suggest that weak deal making is linked to 
CEO dismissals and are consistent with the evidence in Lehn and Zhao (2006) that “poor bidders” 
are more likely to get fired.  
 The pattern is clearly different for the 194 acquisitions announced under the helm of the CEO 
successors. Overall, their deals yield positive and statistically significant mean (median) acquirer 
returns of 1.59% (0.89%), while post-turnover CARs for private deals (2.02%) are higher than for 
public (0.59%). The mean synergistic gain is now also positive and significant (2.05%). The post-
turnover improvement in acquisition performance is sizeable; the return differential is 2.47%, 
significant at the 1% level. Although the bulk of this reversal is attributed to public deals (4.12%), 
representing a major turnaround relative to the large losses incurred pre-turnover, the abnormal 
return differential in private deals is also significantly positive (1.32%), suggesting that CEO 
successors outperform their dismissed counterparts even when they engage in private acquisitions.  
[Table IV about here] 
                                                 
15 For instance, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and Faccio, McConnell, and 
Stolin (2006) report abnormal returns of 1.77%, 1.10%, and 1.17%, respectively. 
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 Panel B (voluntary turnover benchmark) shows that there is no corresponding acquisition 
improvement around voluntary turnovers which have been utilized as a benchmark in other studies 
with similar research design (see for example, Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, et al., 2004). Further, 
in Panel C we control for a number of acquisition return determinants as well as the possibility 
that the documented improvement in acquisition returns following post turnovers is merely a 
product of mean reversion. Accordingly, CAR1-CAR4 adjust acquirer returns of the forced subset 
by the returns of similar deals (in terms of period, industry, deal size, payment mode and 
frequency) drawn from the voluntary and “no-turnover” samples and show that departed 
(successor) CEOs make significantly worse (better) acquisition deals than their peers who 
announce similar deals and keep their job or leave voluntarily. Thus, on top of outperforming their 
fired predecessors, new CEOs create more value through acquisition investments than the average 
CEO reinforcing the view that new CEOs possess sound acquisition investment skills.  
 CAR5 and CAR6 control for pre-turnover performance and post-turnover deal characteristics. 
For CAR5, the last deal of a dismissed CEO is matched with similarly performing (±30%) deals 
from the voluntary and no-turnover samples. Then the corresponding first deal of the CEO 
successor is adjusted by the median performance of similar subsequent deals (in terms of method 
of payment and size) from the performance-based matches previously derived. In addition, CAR6 
controls for mean reversion on a turnover case-by-case level where the mean post-turnover CAR 
(from all deals of CEO successors) is adjusted by the performance of post-turnover deals in the 
voluntary turnover sample with similar pre-turnover performance profile. Thus, holding pre-
turnover performance fixed, the new CEO makes better deals which largely rules out the possibility 
that the documented investment performance improvements are merely a manifestation of random 
performance reversals.  
B. Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer CARs  
 While the univariate results demonstrate that CEO successors carry out better acquisition 
investments than departed CEOs following forced turnovers, it can be argued that they might be 
driven by several firm and deal characteristics, which we control for in cross-section regressions. 
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Our multivariate test is based on the sample of 110 forced and 698 voluntary turnover events where 
both the departed and successor CEOs have completed 3,537 M&A deals within a 5-year period 
preceding and following the turnover event, respectively. The dependent variable in our 
regressions is the acquirers’ 3-day CAR. We use two indicator variables as well as their interaction 
to capture any superior returns associated with forced post-turnover deals. Post, is an indicator 
variable equal to 1, if a deal is completed by a CEO successor and zero otherwise. Forced is equal 
to 1, if a deal is completed by a departed or successor CEO around a forced turnover. Their 
interaction, Post x Forced, captures the incidence of a deal carried out by a CEO successor 
following a forced turnover. The remaining explanatory variables include acquirer size, deal 
relative size, three indicator variable controls for private targets, pure cash transactions and tender 
offers, as well as the acquirer’s market-to-book value, run-up, and debt-to-assets. All variables are 
discussed in the previous section and defined in Table III. We also include industry and year fixed 
effects to account for the return variation within different industries and periods, respectively. To 
reduce the effect of outliers in the dependent variable we calculate the robust squared Mahalanobis 
distances (DSQ) for each acquisition return and winsorize acquisition returns to the next nearest 
value when the DSQ value has probability of chi-square less than 1% (Rousseeuw and Van 
Zomeren, 1990; Riani, Atkinson, and Cerioli, 2009).  
 Regression results are reported in Table V. Regression 1 (2) is estimated using only the forced 
(voluntary) turnover sample, regression 3 uses deals following forced and voluntary turnovers (All 
post), while regressions 4 and 5 are based on the entire sample of 3,427 deals.16 The coefficient of 
Post in specification 1 points to an average outperformance of 3.02% for post-forced-turnover 
deals relative to pre-turnover ones, which is in line with our univariate findings. This return 
improvement is not found for the voluntary subset given the statistically insignificant coefficient 
of Post in regression 2. In regression 3, the Forced coefficient shows that the average deal carried 
out by a CEO successor following a forced turnover event is subject to a 1.36 percentage points 
higher CAR relative to voluntary post-turnover deals. Interestingly, Forced has a negative and 
                                                 
16 The total sample of 3,537 is reduced to 3,427 due to data availability on explanatory variables. 
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significant coefficient in regression 5, apparently driven by the fact that predecessor CEOs in 
forced turnovers do a poor job in generating returns for shareholders. However, this effect is 
reversed when we focus only on forced post-turnover deals consummated by CEO successors as 
reflected in the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction variable Post x Forced. The 
194 acquisition deals carried out by CEO successors following forced turnover events outperform 
all remaining 3,343 deals completed by new and old CEOs by a compelling 2.37%, after 
controlling for several known acquirer CAR determinants. All in all, controlling for other effects, 
the view that dismissed CEOs are replaced with more effective successors gains additional support 
in the data. 
[Table V about here] 
C. Acquisition Returns at Turnover Case Level 
 In this subsection, we conduct an analysis where each turnover case is equally weighted. Figure 
3 provides an illustration of median acquirer CARs for the 110 forced turnovers by deal sequence 
(solid line). The figure compares acquirer CARs around forced turnovers against CARs around 
voluntary turnovers (dotted line) as well as returns from our control sample matched by industry, 
target type, and announcement year (dashed line). Consistent with the rest of our findings so far, 
Figure 3 indicates that pre-turnover deals by dismissed CEOs were typically the worst in terms of 
acquirer returns relative to both control samples. Conversely, deals by their successors generate 
superior shareholder gains relative to both pre-turnover deals and the post-turnover control 
samples. Moreover, pre-turnover deals, on average, underperform control deals irrespective of deal 
order although the realized relative loss is more pronounced nearer the end of the predecessor’s 
deal sequence (Last-1 and Last Deal). This pattern demonstrates a significant deterioration of 
acquisition performance prior to forced turnover events, which, in turn, implies that chief 
executives are more likely to be penalized for their recent mistakes. On the contrary, the 
performance of CEOs that depart voluntarily is relatively similar throughout. Remarkably, the first 
deals of CEO successors following forced turnovers are associated with a median CAR of 0.70%. 
Median returns for later deals continue to uptrend and the positive return differential between CEO 
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successors and their control peers persists throughout their deal sequence. In additional univariate 
results, presented in Table A.1 of the Appendix, we show that while departed CEOs destroy 
aggregate shareholder wealth of 2.15% from all their deals, successor CEOs’ acquisitions increase 
shareholder value by 2.80%. This is equivalent to a $253 million increase in shareholder value for 
the average-size firm in our sample which is tenfold the implied direct cost associated with forced 
turnovers (Taylor, 2010).17 Panel B of Table A.1 also shows that even at the turnover case level, 
disciplinary CEO turnovers result in sizeable acquisition performance improvements. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
D. Propensity Score Matched Acquisition Performance  
 To address more rigorously the possibility that mean reversion is not driving our results, in this 
subsection we match forced turnover cases with similar voluntary ones using a PSM approach.  
 As a first step, we use a probit model to estimate the impact of pre-turnover acquisition 
performance as well as key deal and CEO characteristics on the likelihood of a forced turnover 
occurrence. Our probability model is based on Lehn and Zhao (2006) and features the CAR of the 
departed CEO as its main explanatory variable. The rest of the independent variables capture the 
effects of the payment method, age and tenure of the CEO, transaction relative size and pre- and 
post-acquisition performance (BHR). MStock and MRelSize are the average shares of pure stock 
payment and relative size across all pre-turnover deals of a turnover case. Panel A of Table VI 
reports the regression results for a sample of 110 forced and 698 voluntary turnovers. The 698 
voluntary turnovers pertain to cases where both successors and departed CEOs have completed 
acquisition deals. In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) the main independent variable is the departed 
CEO’s mean (sum) CAR across all deals (denoted MCAR and SCAR, respectively). The negative 
and significant CAR coefficients corroborate Lehn and Zhao’s main finding of an inverse relation 
between acquisition performance and the probability of a CEO being fired. The MCAR coefficient 
                                                 
17 Taylor (2010) estimates the cost of a forced turnover to be 1.33% of a firm’s book value of assets. This cost includes severance 
or retirement packages, fees to executive search firms, disruption costs, and any other CEO turnover costs that affect profits. The 
average firm in our sample has a book value of $1,762.48 million and the implied CEO replacement cost $23.4 million (i.e., 1.33% 
x $1,762.48). This figure is also consistent with the cost of turnover reported in Yermack (2006). 
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in specification 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in MCAR (12%) decreases the 
probability of a forced turnover by almost 30%. The remaining variables are generally consistent 
with the findings in Lehn and Zhao (2006). A notable result from this table is the insignificant 
coefficient of Pre-BHR coupled with the negative coefficient for Post-BHR indicating that 
acquisition related effects on the firm’s stock price drive the decision to fire a CEO, and not the 
pre-acquisition performance. 
[Table VI about here] 
 Panel B reports the PSM results for both performance proxies (MCAR and SCAR) based on two 
different techniques: i) the nearest-neighbor matching; and ii) the Gaussian kernel matching. 
Propensity scores are estimated from regressions 2 and 4. Departed CEOs are matched with their 
nearest (one-to-one), thirty, and fifty neighbors. Treated sample CARs correspond to forced post-
turnover CARs and Control CARs to their matched CARs. MCAR and SCAR for the treated 
samples are both positive whereas control sample CARs are negative. The differences between the 
treated and the control samples are almost always significant, ranging from 1.44% to 3.40%. 
Overall, alternative matching approaches, based on the closest predicted probability, still indicate 
that the investment performance of new CEOs that take office following forced turnover events is 
associated with a significant premium which is consistent with our baseline results. 
III. Drivers of Acquisition Performance Change around Turnovers  
 In this section, we directly investigate whether monitoring mechanisms associated with the 
firm’s corporate governance and ownership structure as well as managerial attributes influence the 
quality of CEO replacement decisions, amplifying the observed improvement in investment 
performance. Our multivariate framework involves cross-section regressions of the post-minus-
pre-turnover difference in acquirer CARs (ΔCAR) on governance, ownership, CEO, and deal 
characteristics.  
 Corporate governance has been associated with acquisition quality (Masulis, et al., 2007) as 
well as the probability of replacing poorly performing dealmakers (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). 
Weisbach (1988) and Borokhovich, et al. (1996) show that boards with greater number of outside 
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directors are more likely to dismiss poorly performing CEOs and replace them with ones that create 
shareholder value while Huson, et al. (2004) find that post-turnover profitability improvements are 
positively related to the percentage of outsiders on the board. Moreover, Jenter and Lewellen 
(2014) provide evidence that firms with high quality boards recover more quickly from negative 
stock performance after changing their CEO. Along these lines, it is possible that stronger boards 
learn from their prior mistakes and make more optimal CEO replacement decisions, therefore 
hiring better CEO successors and/or improving the firm’s monitoring function over acquisition 
decisions post-turnover, leading to more pronounced investment performance turnarounds. 
Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we measure the quality of corporate governance with 
board independence (see also Huson, et al., 2004; Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell, 2008). BoD independence is defined as the percentage of outsiders relative to the total 
directors siting on the board of the firm as reported in the proxy statement prior to the turnover 
announcement. 
 A firm’s ownership structure can also have an impact on the effectiveness of corporate 
monitoring and influence CEO replacement decisions. The presence of large outside shareholders, 
for instance, can contribute to increased monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and thus affect the 
quality of the decisions reached at the executive and corporate-board level. There is also anecdotal 
evidence that hedge fund activism often puts public pressure on management to implement 
directional changes in corporate strategy and governance. Along these lines, Brav, et al. (2008) 
report that activist targeting by hedge funds tends to be followed by CEO turnover. Since hedge 
fund investors can induce or expedite CEO dismissals it is possible that they may also facilitate 
superior replacement decisions and/or contribute to better monitoring of the acquisition process 
following a CEO turnover, resulting in investment quality and firm performance improvements. 
We use two indicator variables to control for the presence of large outside shareholders (Outside 
blockholder) and hedge fund block ownership (Hedge fund), respectively.  
 While a stronger board and/or the presence of outside blockholders may lead to the appointment 
of a CEO with superior skills, Guthrie and Datta (1997) argue that pre-succession CEO life, career, 
and functional experience should be important differentiating factors in CEO selection decisions 
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and Bragaw and Misangyi (2013) provide evidence that chief executives with prior CEO 
experience are more desirable as they receive higher compensation packages. Moreover, the 
organization theory and strategic management literature suggest that poorly performing firms 
should focus on hiring new executives with the ability and skills to achieve turnarounds (see Hofer, 
1980; Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Chen and Hambrick, 2012). While CEO ability is difficult to 
quantify, it is unequivocally linked to experience. Thus, we use experience, age, and compensation 
as proxies for CEO quality. ΔExperience is the difference in years of experience as chief executive 
between the two CEOs. Information on CEO experience is hand-collected from the Marquis Who’s 
Who database and complemented with searches in SEC filings, Forbes Profiles, and Bloomberg 
Business Week (Executive Profiles). ΔSalary is the difference in compensation (scaled by total 
assets) of the CEO successor and the dismissed CEO. Compensation information is collected from 
SEC filings around the turnover. ΔAge is the age differential between the successor and departed 
CEO. To capture the effect of related industry experience, we include a binary variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the new CEO was previously employed by a company with the same business 
description (Specialist successor). 
 In all regression specifications, we control for differences in deal-level characteristics between 
pre- and post-turnover acquisitions that may explain the variation in ΔCARs.18 Table VII reports 
the regression results. In specifications 1-3 the dependent variable is the difference in mean 
acquisition returns (ΔMCAR) between the fired and successor CEOs while in specifications 4-6 
performance change is derived from aggregate acquirer gain differentials (ΔSCAR). The coefficient 
of board independence (BoD), a main variable of interest, is positive and statistically significant 
at conventional levels in all regressions. This is in line with existing evidence that better 
governance can instigate improvements in firm performance following turnovers (Huson, et al., 
2004). The effect of corporate governance is economically important. In specification 3, an 
interquartile change in board independence is equivalent to an increase in acquisition performance 
improvement (ΔMCAR) by 2.00 percentage points. In regression 6, ΔSCAR increases by 3.15 
                                                 
18 Table A.2 of the Appendix shows the correlation analysis of the independent variables used in these regressions and suggests 
that there are not any serious multicollinearity problems. 
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percentage points in response to an interquartile change in board independence. There are at least 
two reasons why the magnitude of post-turnover investment performance improvement increases 
with board independence. The first is that more independent boards tend to make more effective 
replacement decisions and appoint CEOs with greater deal-making skills relative to their 
predecessors. The second is that stronger boards carry out their monitoring function more 
effectively post-turnover leading to corporate investment decisions of higher quality (Masulis, et 
al., 2007; Dahya, Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2016). 
 Another important consideration is that board independence is measured shortly prior to CEO 
turnovers and thus ignores any variation in a board’s composition since the appointment of a CEO 
predecessor. In an untabulated regression, when we replace BoD independence with 
Δ(BoDIndependence) measured around pre- and post-turnover deals we find it to be statistically 
insignificant. Hence, the effect of corporate governance seems to be more static than dynamic (i.e., 
changes in governance do not matter while the general level of governance around the turnover 
does). Considering that the typical board composition changes only moderately since the 
appointment of a CEO predecessor (see Section I), it is unlikely that post-turnover deals create 
more value because corporate governance has improved relative to the pre-turnover period. 
Instead, our findings seem to be indicative of corporate learning; stronger boards are generally 
more likely to learn from and correct their prior mistakes, which entails hiring superior CEO 
successors and/or performing their monitoring role more diligently.  
 Regarding the effect of blockholder ownership, the coefficient of Outside blockholder is 
insignificant implying that large outside shareholders in general have little influence over the 
quality of hiring decisions and acquisition performance following CEO dismissals. However, the 
coefficient of Hedge fund, which captures the presence of a hedge fund blockholder, is positive 
and significant in regressions 3 and 6. The presence of a hedge fund blockholder increases the 
acquisition return improvement, ΔMCAR (ΔSCAR) by 3.35 (5.00) percentage points. This result is 
consistent with the view that hedge funds require leadership changes to attain their valuation 
potential that can be ultimately achieved by applying pressure on board members to fire 
underperforming CEOs. It also suggests that external monitoring by large shareholders and, in 
21 
 
particular, hedge funds, not only precipitates CEO turnover (Brav, et al., 2008) but considerably 
enhances the quality of new CEO hiring decisions. An alternative explanation could be that hedge 
funds exert public pressure on the new executive suite and influence the quality of acquisition 
decisions. 
 Turning our focus to the variables that are meant to capture the impact of CEO experience, we 
find that the effects of ΔAge, ΔSalary, and the Specialist successor indicator variable to be 
insignificant. Yet, ΔExperience is positively related to the post-turnover acquisition return 
improvement. Its coefficient in specification 6 indicates that an interquartile change amplifies 
ΔSCAR by 2.08 percentage points. This suggests that prior CEO experience plays a pivotal role in 
achieving performance turnarounds and should be thus considered by boards of directors when 
implementing executive suite makeovers.  
[Table VII about here] 
 Finally, some of the deal and firm related control variables appear to exhibit a strong relation 
with ΔCARs as anticipated. For instance, differences in private deals (ΔPrivateDeals), acquirer 
size (ΔSize), deal relative size (ΔRelSize), and market-to-book (ΔMTBV) value also yield the 
expected significant coefficients in most specifications. The explanatory power of the rest of the 
variables is in most cases trivial.  
IV. Long-Run Post Acquisition Performance 
 In this section, we examine whether the documented differentials in post-to-pre turnover 
acquisition returns persist beyond the 3-day announcement window. To assess if successor CEOs 
deliver superior post-acquisition performance relative to their dismissed predecessors, we regress 
long-run abnormal stock return (BHARs) and operating performance (AROA) measures for 
different post-acquisition time intervals on the same set of our key variables of interest, controlling 
for other effects, as in Table V.  
[Table VIII about here] 
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 Table VIII presents the long-run regression results. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) estimated over a 12- and 24-month window using a 
benchmark based on the return of the corresponding 25 size- and book-to-market reference 
portfolios (see, e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999). How well do 
successors of fired CEOs perform compared to all other CEOs, is captured through the interaction 
indicator Post x Forced, our main variable of interest, which is positive and significant in all 
regression specifications indicating that successor CEOs generate higher long-run shareholder 
returns through acquisition investments. In regression 4, post-turnover deals following a CEO 
dismissal generate a 2.01% higher abnormal return than all other deals in the forced and voluntary 
subsets. 
 In Panel B, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted post-acquisition operating 
performance of the acquiring firm (AROA) estimated over a three- and five-year period. Following 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), we control for pre-acquisition operating performance while we 
also include the same explanatory variables as in Panel A. Our tests focus on the operating 
performance of the acquiring firm since financial information for target companies in the subset 
of private deals is not available. As before, our main variable of interest, Post x Forced, is positive 
and significant in all specifications, ranging from 2.52% to 2.85%, providing supplemental 
evidence in support of the view that CEO successors improve the firm’s operating performance 
through acquisition investments following forced turnovers.  
V. Do CEO Successors Employ More Optimal Investment Strategies? 
 Our main analysis so far has focused on gauging the value added (i.e., stock and operating 
performance) impact of CEO successors’ investment decisions relative to their fired counterparts 
through M&A investments. This approach is motivated by the fact that acquisitions represent 
discretionary CEO investment decisions with directly measurable outcomes that allow us to assess 
a CEO’s investment skill relative to other investment decisions that are smaller in dollar value and 
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less significant as means of achieving high growth opportunities.19 To draw additional insights on 
CEO successors’ general ability to improve firm outcomes by adopting more optimal investment 
strategies relative to their dismissed CEO counterparts, we also examine their total net investment 
efficiency. This approach incorporates organic investments such as CAPEX and R&D and thus 
allows us to include in our test cases of CEO successors that do not necessarily consummate 
acquisition investments (non-acquisitive successors).  
 Accordingly, we measure inefficient investment, INEFFINV, as investment that diverges from 
the expected level of investment, given the firm’s growth opportunities, Q, using a model 
motivated by the literature on optimal investment (see, e.g., Hubbard, 1998; Biddle and Hilary, 
2006; McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Cheng, Dhaliwal, and 
Zhang, 2013). More specifically, we run the regression, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖  , where 
total investment, INVi,t, is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions 
minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place for firm i in year t from 
Compustat, scaled by prior-year book value of total assets. Following Richardson (2006) and 
Biddle, et al. (2009), the above measure of investment includes both capital and non-capital 
expenditures. Xi,t-1 is a vector of firm characteristics which tend to influence investment decisions 
such as the firm’s growth opportunities, leverage, cash, age, size, past stock returns, and prior firm 
level investment. The absolute value of the residual from the investment efficiency equation 
measures the extent of managerial investment inefficiency (INEFFINV).  
 Total new investment regression results are reported in Table IX based on firm-year 
observations for the 5-year pre- and post-turnover windows. Panel B reports INEFFINV statistics 
for successor and departed CEOs. As shown in Panel B, both the mean and median difference in 
INEFFINV between new and fired CEOs are negative and highly significant suggesting that CEO 
successors generally adopt more efficient investment strategies than their predecessors. The results 
are very similar for the subset of non-acquisitive CEO successors confirming that even CEOs that 
                                                 
19 With many firms struggling to identify organic growth opportunities, acquisitions are frequently used as the main path (inorganic) 
for growth. US deal volume reached $2.53 trillion in 2015 according to SDC. By comparison the total value of CAPEX and R&D 
for all US firms on Compustat for the same year was $1.47 trillion.  
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do not engage in new acquisitions following forced turnovers still employ more optimal investment 
strategies relative to their predecessors. 
[Table IX about here] 
VI. Divestment Analysis  
 Existing evidence on operational downsizing following CEO turnovers is consistent with the 
agency-based view that executive successors tend to take corrective action to reverse value-
destroying investment decisions (Weisbach, 1995; Pan, et al., 2016). While our results thus far 
appear to be associated with successful post-turnover investment strategies, in this section we also 
examine the divestitures of outgoing and new CEOs as well as the associated value implications 
for shareholders. Table X compares the divestment activity and performance of fired (columns 1-
3) and successor CEOs (columns 4-6). The analysis includes the subset of 116 cases where the 
successor CEO does not complete any acquisition deals in the post-turnover period (‘non-
acquisitive successor’ columns 3 and 6). Panels A and B report figures at deal and turnover case 
level, respectively.  
[Table X about here] 
 Divestitures are asset sales from SDC where a firm in our sample is indicated as the target in 
acquisitions of assets transactions. These fulfill the same criteria as our M&A deals to ensure they 
are economically significant. Overall, new and old CEOs carry out similar number of divestitures 
(74 vs 78) valued at $41.7 billion and $42.9 billion, respectively. Divestments comprise 27.6% of 
the total acquisition and divestiture activity of successor CEOs (Divestitures share) compared to 
only 12.6% for chief executives that were forced-out. The magnitude of the difference is similar 
in dollar value terms (Divestitures value share). Successors complete at least one divestiture in 
only 51 out of 226 cases (Panel B, column 4) which is quite similar to the 44 sell-offs carried out 
by fired CEOs with sell-offs pre-turnover. While acquisitive successors do not carry out more asset 
sales than their predecessors, the opposite is the case for non-acquisitive successors who evidently 
focus more on divestitures.  
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 Asset sales taken from SDC do not incorporate cases where operations are ceased altogether 
rather than sold to another company. Thus, we also use data for discontinued operations from 
Compustat following Pan, et al. (2016). In Panel B, the share of cases with discontinued operations 
for the CEO successor for instance is the percentage of turnover cases (with data availability) 
where the firm reports income or loss from discontinued operations at least once during the 5-year 
post-turnover period. Our findings reveal that a discontinued operation occurrence is more than 
twice as likely under the helm of the successor CEO (49.75%) relative to the departed one (21%). 
We also estimate the average number of years (occurrences) for which discontinued operations are 
reported which is three times higher for CEO successors (1.3 compared to 0.4). The differences 
are statistically significant and indicate that new CEOs are more likely to dispose subsidiaries or 
bring operations to a halt relative to their departed counterparts.  
 Finally, the table reports abnormal returns to divestiture announcements for old and new CEOs 
(Divestment CAR in Panel A). Consistent with our findings on acquisition announcement gains, 
there is a large positive return difference between pre- and post-turnover divestitures, highlighting 
that CEO successors are better in discarding existing assets and creating value by selling them off 
in addition to acquiring new ones. Although we do not find direct evidence that the divestitures 
carried out by the new CEOs are associated with their predecessors’ investments, it seems 
reasonable to attribute the significant divestment gains to the ability of new CEOs to identify 
underperforming assets and create value by selling them off.20 This is consistent with our main 
result that corporate boards are effective in replacing value destroying top executives. Further, the 
particularly compelling 7.61% CAR around divestment announcements by non-acquisitive CEO 
successors suggests that they also manage to generate significant value for their shareholders 
through corporate divestments.  
                                                 
20 Only in six cases do CEO successors dispose a subsidiary that was previously acquired by their predecessors. However, 
divestment may take the form of ceasing operations or disposing business lines associated with companies acquired before.  
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VII. Robustness and Additional Tests 
 In this section, we perform several additional tests to check the robustness of our results. 21 First 
we establish that the forced turnover sample specification does not affect our main results. 
Following prior research (see, e.g., Warner, et al., 1988; Denis and Denis, 1995), we reclassify 
turnover cases for which there is no sufficient information to classify them (no reason given in 
Table I) as forced (instead of voluntary) and find that this does not affect our main results and 
conclusions. Our results also do not change when we remove these cases completely from our 
sample. In addition, we employ Lehn and Zhao’s alternative classification for forced turnovers and 
find that the magnitude of the documented improvement in investment performance remains 
unchanged. We also find that using alternative CEO age retirement benchmarks in the 
classification of forced turnovers do not affect our results. Furthermore, to ensure the post-turnover 
1% deal relative size criterion is not too lenient, we also examine the subset of 74 cases where 
post-turnover deals satisfy the 10% cumulative relative size criterion utilized for pre-turnover deals 
and obtain even stronger results. Yet, we note that imposing such a criterion for post-turnover deals 
not only reduces our sample significantly, but might also be viewed being subject to sample 
selection bias. Another concern arising from subsection II.C is that that CEO successors’ first deal 
might be driving the post-turnover performance improvement. To rule out this possibility, we re-
estimate regressions 1 to 5 of Table V by excluding the first deal of these successors or excluding 
both the first deal of the successor and the last of the predecessor and find qualitatively similar 
results. Our long-run results in Table VIII are not affected either when excluding the first deal of 
the successor CEO. We also run a test to determine whether our findings change when using un-
winsorized returns or winsorizing at the 1%-99% level instead of utilising robust squared 
Mahalanobis distances and find that they are not affected.  
 Golubov, Yawson, and Zhang (2015) show in a recent paper that time-invariant firm 
characteristics explain a large part of the variation of acquisition returns. Therefore, we also 
perform additional tests to ensure that our results are not sensitive to firm fixed effects. The 
                                                 
21 For brevity, these additional robustness results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
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inclusion of firm fixed effects is also an effective way to mitigate potential omitted variable biases. 
Accordingly, we re-run the regressions in Table V and Table VIII by using firm and year (instead 
of industry and year) fixed effects and find that our results remain very similar. Most importantly, 
consistent with our previous results, the main interaction variable of interest Post x Forced remains 
positive and highly significant. In Table VII, we also examine the impact of additional control 
variables. We replace ΔSalary with the difference in equity-based compensation (∆EBC). In 
addition, we use an indicator to capture the occurrence of an insider appointment instead of the 
Specialist successor dummy. We also use differences in finance-oriented education as an 
additional CEO quality measure, but this reduces our sample dramatically due to limited data 
availability for several CEOs. The impact of education based on this small sample is insignificant. 
Further, we employ several additional variables that have been associated with corporate 
governance such as board size, the GIM Index, inside ownership, and CEO ownership and find 
that in most cases these variables are statistically insignificant although the coefficient of board 
independence remains significant. We note, however, that the GIM Index is only available for 63 
firms in our sample which makes it difficult to draw any fruitful conclusions while the other three 
measures might be viewed as not entirely unproblematic proxies of corporate governance quality.  
 In Table III, we show that CEO successors engage in less public acquisitions while in Table 
VII the post-to-pre turnover M&A gain upturn is positively relative to the corresponding 
differential in private deal concentration. To gain further insight on whether switching to private 
targets drives our results, we examine acquirer’s CARs for different levels of change in private 
deal concentration for both forced and voluntary turnovers. We find that for around half the 
turnover cases in our sample (voluntary and forced) there is no switching to private targets (i.e., 
share of private deals pre-turnover is equal to the post-turnover). We find that in this subset, there 
is still an improvement in M&A performance in forced turnovers while a deterioration in voluntary 
turnovers. Further, switching to more private deals the results reveal higher acquisition CARs for 
both forced and voluntary turnovers even though CARs are more pronounced for the forced subset. 
Finally, even when switching to more public deals, CEO successors still outperform their 
predecessors following forced turnovers (although the differential is statistically insignificant). 
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Overall, there is no evidence that CEO successors are more likely to switch to private deals after 
forced turnovers while the documented improvement in acquisition performance is not driven 
exclusively by cases where they do. 
 Finally, in Sections V and VI we report that non-acquisitive CEO successors adopt more 
efficient investment strategies and carry out divestitures that are received favorably by the market, 
similar to acquisitive successors. Yet, if non-acquisitive successors are more conservative when 
carrying out new acquisition investments - and forgo positive NPV risky investments - one would 
expect that they are not as successful as acquisitive successors are in terms of increasing long-term 
firm value. To examine this conjecture, we compare the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal stock 
performance of acquisitive and non-acquisitive successor CEOs in an untabulated test. Results 
confirm that acquisitive CEOs successors significantly outperform their counterparts for up to five 
years following the acquisition announcement suggesting that risk-taking CEOs benefit 
shareholders more in the long run. These results are in line with the theoretical model of Edmans 
and Manso (2011) and Croci and Petmezas (2015) who find that risk-taking CEOs (i.e., acquisitive 
CEOs) select investments (i.e., M&As) that yield higher bidder stock returns. 
VIII. Conclusion  
 In this study, we examine whether forced CEO replacements lead to firm performance 
improvements through CEO successors’ superior investment decisions. Our results indicate that 
CEO successors enhance firm performance by engaging in superior mergers and acquisitions than 
their predecessors. Our analysis also shows that new CEOs tend to systematically reverse poorly 
performing investments through asset disposals and discontinuing operations, creating significant 
shareholder value while they also generally adopt more efficient investment strategies through 
CAPEX and R&D. Strong internal and external monitoring mechanisms as well as managerial 
experience seem to be instrumental in replacing poorly performing CEOs with superior successors. 
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view that CEOs at publicly listed companies should 
be dismissed more often when they underperform and boards should align executive pay policies 
with performance to reduce the burden from CEO dismissals. 
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Appendix 
A. Detailed Description of Turnover and Acquisition Samples  
 As reported in subsection I.A, we obtain 2,386 turnovers corresponding to 4,949 pre-turnover 
deals that satisfy our sample selection criteria. CEO successors consummate an additional 1,627 
deals within a 5-year post-turnover window.  
 Turnovers are partitioned in forced and voluntary based on news searches in LexisNexis around 
the turnover announcement. Following Parrino (1997) and Huson, et al. (2004), we classify a 
turnover as forced when the CEO is fired, forced out of his position or departed due to policy 
differences (130 cases). Turnovers due to death, poor health, acceptance of another position, or 
normal succession are classified as voluntary (270). From the 783 cases associated with CEO 
retirement or resignation, 208 are tentatively treated as forced as the CEO was less than 60 years 
old at the turnover announcement and left the firm within six months.22 The remaining 575 are 
regarded as voluntary departures. When we cannot find a reason for the turnover (329) or when 
this was due to restructuring, separation of chairman and CEO position or a spinoff (19) it is then 
grouped along with the voluntary departures. From the remaining 855 cases, if the CEO left the 
firm we treat the turnover as tentatively forced (304) and voluntary otherwise (551). In order to 
reduce classification errors, we revisit all 512 cases classified as tentatively forced by searching 
the business news using a more extensive window around the turnover and reclassify (378) cases 
as voluntary if we do not find concrete evidence that the CEO was dismissed or left due to reasons 
associated with the firm's business activities. Through the above classification process, we obtain 
264 forced and 2,122 voluntary turnover events.  
 We further exclude cases where the firm delists around the turnover. Although this continuity 
constraint limits our sample, post-turnover firm survival is necessary given our focus on assessing 
the investment decisions and performance of new CEOs relative to their predecessors. There are 
598, 21, and 121 cases that are excluded from the analysis as a result of firms being acquired, filing 
                                                 
22 Parrino (1997) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) also employ the same cutoff. CEOs typically retire at 62 to 65 since they are under 
3-year employment contracts. 
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for bankruptcy, and delisting for other reasons, respectively. To ensure that this exclusion does not 
give rise to any sample selection effects on our results we compare the pre-turnover acquisition 
performance of our main sample with that for the non-surviving firms that have been omitted and 
find the two to be almost identical. Hence, our sample allows us to draw broad inferences whether 
shareholders are better off from the acquisitions and auxiliary corporate strategies of new CEOs 
who succeed dismissed top executives. 
 
B. Departed and Successor CEO Acquisition Performance Comparison at Turnover Case Level 
 Table A.1 of the Appendix, provides a comprehensive univariate comparison of the old and new 
CEOs acquisition performance at the turnover case level based on different return measures and 
return estimations as described in subection II.C.  
[Table A.1 about here] 
 
C. Correlation among Independent Variables 
 To rule out any multicollinearity concerns, we report in Table A.2 the Pearson correlation 
coefficients of all the independent variables included in the regression analysis of Table VII. This 
table shows that the highest (in absolute terms) pairwise correlation in Table VII is 0.51. We also 
estimate Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for all independent variables and find they are less 
than 2 (untabulated), corroborating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be cause for concern (see, 
Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004). Yet, removing any highly correlated variables from the 
regression estimation does not affect our main results.  
[Table A.2 about here] 
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Completed at least 1 deal with 
relative size ≥ 1% 
(n=110 cases) 
- Completed at least 1 M&A deal 
- Aggregate deal relative size ≥ 10% 
(n=226 cases) 
Did not complete 
any deals  
(n=116 cases)  
Figure 1. Research Design for the Forced Turnover Sample 
The figure illustrates the sample research design for the subset of 226 forced CEO turnovers that fulfills the criteria described in 
Table I. The CEO successors pertaining to the 226 cases are grouped based on whether they have completed at least one control 
M&A deal of a public or private target valued at $10 million or more where the deal relative size is equal to or larger than 1% 
within a 5-year post-turnover window. The M&A sample spans from 1989 to 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. M&A Deal Distribution for the Subset of the 110 Forced Turnover Cases 
The figure illustrates the distribution of 464 M&A deals announced between 1989 and 2016 around the 110 forced turnover cases 
where both, the departed and successor CEOs have consummated acquisition investments within the 5-year pre- and post-turnover 
respectively. The forced turnover and M&A samples are described in Table I and Figure 1. 
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Figure 3. Departed and Successor Acquisition Performance by Deal Order - Against Benchmark 
The figure plots acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a sample of 464 deals of M&As announced between 1989 and 2016 around 110 forced CEO turnover 
events (solid line) against i) CARs from control sample deals matched by industry, target type, and announcement year (dashed line) and ii) CARs around voluntary 
turnovers (dotted line). The forced, voluntary, and control samples as well as the CAR estimation are described in Table I, Table III, and Table IV. Deals are assigned to 
subgroups based on their deal sequence relative to the turnover event within a 5-year pre and post-turnover periods. Last Deal for instance denotes the last deal of departed 
CEOs and Last-1 the second to last deal for those that have completed more than one transaction within the 5-year pre-turnover window. n is the number of deals 
pertaining to each deal sequence subset for the forced turnover sample only. 
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Table I. Turnover Sample Characteristics 
The table presents information on turnover classification and departed CEO destination for a sample of 1,646 CEO turnover events 
that took place between 1994 and 2011 preceded by M&A deals with cumulative relatives size of 10%. The firms involved are 
listed in NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX, have data in CRSP and Compustat, a market capitalization equal to or greater than $10 
million (in 2011 dollars) and do not delist around the turnover. The departed CEO has completed at least one control acquisition 
(the acquirer’s ownership of the target is less than 10% prior to the acquisition announcement and more than 50% following the 
deal completion) of a public or private target valued at $10 million or more in the 5-year window preceding the turnover event. The 
target-to-acquirer relative size of each individual deal is at least 1% but for inclusion of a turnover case in the sample the aggregate 
relative size of all deals completed by the departed CEO within the 5-year pre-turnover window must be at least 10%. Relative size 
is the ratio of the transaction value to the acquirer market value one month prior to the acquisition announcement from SDC. 
Turnovers are identified from SEC proxy statements and/or annual/current reports and complemented and verified by searches in 
LexisNexis. Turnovers are partitioned in forced and voluntary based on news searches in LexisNexis around the turnover 
announcement. Following, Parrino (1997) and Huson, et al. (2004) a turnover is classified as forced when the CEO was fired, 
forced out of his position or departed due to policy differences. Turnovers where the reason for the replacement was due to death, 
poor health, acceptance of another position, or normal succession are treated as voluntary. If the CEO retired or resigned from his 
position, without specific evidence that he was forced to, the turnover is classified as voluntary, unless the CEO was less than 60 
years old (at the turnover announcement) and left the firm within six months from the retirement announcement in which case a 
turnover is tentatively classified as forced. Cases where we find no reason for the turnover or this was due to restructuring, 
separation of chairman and CEO position or a spinoff are classified as voluntary. From the remaining cases, if the CEO left the 
firm we classify the departure as tentatively forced and voluntary otherwise. Turnovers originally grouped as tentatively forced are 
then revisited by searching the business news using a more extensive window and are reclassified as voluntary if there is no concrete 
evidence that the CEO was dismissed or left due to reasons associated with the firm’s business activities. Panel A reports number 
of cases by turnover type and rationale. Panel B reports number of cases by turnover type and departed CEO destination. Top3, 
Director, and Other employee include cases where the CEO was retained within the firm. Other includes cases where the CEO 
deceased and where no destination information was identified. Panel C reports the number of turnovers for different sub-periods. 
 Forced turnovers  Voluntary turnovers 
Panel A: Turnover classification    
Forced out/fired  87  Normal succession 154  
Policy differences/conflict  11 Accept other position 65 
Other forced  128  Death/poor health 43 
   No reason given 310  
   Retirement 454  
   Resignation 193  
   Other voluntary 201  
Total  226  Total 1,420  
Panel B: Departed CEO destination   
Top 3  11   663 
Director  11   169 
Other employee  6  180 
Left firm  198   375  
Other  0   33  
Total   226   1,420  
Panel C: Turnover distribution   
1994-1999  80  446 
2000-2005  110  645 
2006-2011  36  329 
Total  226  1,420 
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Table II. CEO, Board, and Ownership Characteristics for the Forced Turnover Sample 
The table reports CEO, Board of Directors (BoD), and beneficial ownership information for the sample of 110 forced turnovers 
where both the departed and successor CEOs have completed acquisition deals within the 5-year pre- and post-turnover windows, 
respectively. The sample of 110 turnovers is described in Table I and Figure 2. Panel A reports statistics on departed and successor 
CEO characteristics. Age is the CEO’s age measured at the turnover year for departed CEOs and at the year they take office for 
successors. Tenure is the departed CEO’s tenure within the firm in years. Chairman (Founder) (%) is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the BoD (the company’s founder or co-founder) and zero otherwise. Internal (Outsider) (%) is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO joined the firm prior to (during) the turnover year and zero otherwise. Specialist 
successor (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO was previously employed by a company with the same business 
description and zero otherwise. Curriculum information on the executives is hand-collected from the Marquis Who’s Who database 
and complemented with searches in SEC filings, Forbes Profiles, and Bloomberg Business Week (Executive Profiles). CEO 
experience (years) is the number of years the chief executive has served as a CEO prior to the turnover event. Experienced CEO 
at appointment (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the chief executive has any experience as a CEO prior to joining the firm 
and zero otherwise. Finance degree (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a finance related degree and zero 
otherwise. Compensation (%) is the ratio of total CEO compensation to the firm’s total assets at the year prior to (following) their 
departure (appointment). Total compensation comprises of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock awards, stock 
option awards, long-term incentive performance plans, and all other compensation and is collected from the SEC filings. Stock 
option awards (%) is the ratio of the total dollar value of the stock option awards of the CEO to the firm’s total assets at the year 
prior to (following) their departure (appointment). Salary and bonus (%) is the ratio of the CEO’s salary and bonus compensation 
to the firm’s total assets at the year prior to (following) their departure (appointment). Panel B reports BoD and ownership 
information prior to the turnover event. BoD independence (%) is the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board 
relative to the firm’s total directors as reported in the proxy statement prior to the turnover announcement. The grouping of 
independent directors is based on the Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) classification. Same directors (%) is the percentage of 
directors sitting in the board that have remained unchanged since the proxy statement prior to the appointment of the old CEO. 
Same chairman (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the board reported in the proxy statement prior to the 
turnover announcement is the same since the proxy statement prior to the appointment of the CEO predecessor and zero otherwise. 
Outside blockholder (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an external blockholder owns at least 5% of the company’s shares 
outstanding and zero otherwise. Beneficial ownership information is collected from the last proxy statement prior to the turnover 
event. Hedge fund (%) in an indicator variable equal to 1 if a hedge fund or private equity firm owns at least 5% of the company’s 
shares and zero otherwise. Hedge fund classification is based on extensive web and news searches. Difference tests are based on a 
t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A: CEO characteristics  
  Departed Successor Difference 
Age (years) mean 51.8 49.5 -2.3** 
 median 52.0 49.0 -3.0** 
Tenure (years) mean 7.2 - - 
 median 5.0 - - 
Chairman (%) mean 49.5 43.1 -6.4 
Founder (%) mean 11.9 6.4 -5.6 
Internal (%) mean - 45.5 - 
Outsider (%) mean - 54.5 - 
Specialist successor (%) mean - 81.81 - 
CEO experience (years) mean 8.47 3.96 -4.51*** 
 median 7.00 2.00 -5.00*** 
Experienced CEO at  
appointment (%) 
 
mean 22.95 58.20 35.25*** 
Finance degree (%) mean 50.0 66.5 17.5** 
Compensation (%) mean 0.77 0.97 0.20 
 median 0.28 0.30 0.02 
Stock option awards (%) mean 0.55 0.83 0.29 
 median 0.10 0.17 0.07 
Salary and bonus (%) mean 0.14 0.11 -0.03 
 median 0.06 0.04 -0.02* 
Panel B: BoD and ownership characteristics at turnover  
   Turnover  
BoD independence (%) mean  67.02  
 median  66.67  
Same directors (%) mean  60.43  
 median  63.07  
Same chairman (%) mean  44.19  
 median  0.00  
Outside blockholder (%) mean  72.29  
 median  100.00  
Hedge fund (%) mean  31.82  
 median  0.00  
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Table III. Deal and Firm Summary Statistics 
The table reports deal- and firm-related summary statistics. Pre all Column reports pre-turnover deal statistics for the full sample 
of 226 forced turnovers that meet the criteria described in Table I. The Pre and Post columns report deal statistics for the sample 
of 110 turnover cases where both the departed and successor CEOs have completed acquisition deals within the pre- and post-
turnover 5-year windows, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1. The Control sample consists of 6,959 deals and includes i) 4,342 
deals announced within the 5-years following or preceding voluntary turnover events and ii) 2,617 deals that fulfill the same criteria 
as those in the pre-turnover sample but where the CEO was not subsequently replaced. Turnovers is the number of turnover cases. 
No-turnover is the number of cases where the acquirer was not replaced within a 5-year period after consummating deals with 
aggregate relative size of at least 10%. Acquirers is the number of unique acquirers/firms and Deals is the number of deals they 
completed. Deal value is the transaction value in million dollars from SDC. ASize (TSize) is the acquirer’s (target’s) market value 
one month prior to the acquisition announcement from SDC. Dollar values are in 2011 dollars. RelSize (%) is the ratio of the deal 
value to the acquirer market value one month prior to the acquisition announcement from SDC. Public (%) is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the target is public and zero otherwise. Stock (Cash) (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if payment is in pure stock 
(cash) and zero otherwise. Focus (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target has the same 2-digit SIC as the acquirer. Tender 
(%), is an indicator variable from SDC equal to 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and zero otherwise. Cross-border (%) is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a non-US firm and zero otherwise. Premium (%) is the offer price over the target’s share 
price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement from SDC, multiplied by 100 and reported for observations between zero 
and two. IA premium (%) is the Premium adjusted by the median premium paid for targets in the same industry within the same 
year. AMTBV is the acquirer’s equity market-to-book value estimated using ASize and book value of equity at the fiscal year prior 
to the acquisition announcement from Compustat. ATobin is the acquirer’s Tobin’s q estimated as book value of total assets minus 
book value of equity plus market value of equity at the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement from Compustat. ARunUp 
(%) is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the acquirer from 205 to 6 trading days prior the acquisition announcement from 
CRSP. ADebt (%) is the acquiring firm’s ratio of total debt (long-term and interest bearing short-term debt) over total assets from 
Compustat at the fiscal year prior the acquisition announcement. Difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-
test for medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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   Forced turnover  Control sample 
   (1) Pre all 
(2) 
Pre 
(3) 
Post 
(3) - (2) 
Difference 
(2) - (1) 
Difference  (4) 
Turnovers n  226 110 110 - -  1,420 
No-turnover n  - - - - -  1,152 
Acquirers n  222 106 106 - -  2,401 
Deals  n  539 270 194 - -  6,959 
Deal value mean  1,155 1,439 884 -554 284  675 
 median  135 178 109 -69*** 43**  91 
ASize mean  7,362 11,137 9,025 -2,112 3,775  3,810 
 median  1,200 1,768 1,147 -621** 568***  811 
TSize mean  2,502 2,774 1,909 -865 272  1,578 
 
 
 
 
median  399 613 261 -352* 214  207 
RelSize (%) mean  31.13 28.27 25.72 -2.55 -2.86  34.71 
median  13.30 10.42 10.59 0.17 -2.88*  13.47 
Public (%) mean  28.94 37.41 30.41 -7.00 8.46***  23.84 
Stock (%) mean  37.89 46.40 12.34 -34.06*** 8.51***  28.03 
Cash (%) mean  22.78 24.77 44.16 19.38*** 1.99  31.90 
Focus (%) mean  55.84 60.00 59.79 -0.21 4.16  58.50 
Tender (%) mean  5.19 6.67 5.67 -1.00 1.47  3.49 
Cross-border (%) mean  7.98 9.63 10.82 1.20 1.65  9.25 
Premium (%) mean  46.46 45.91 42.50 -3.41 -0.55  45.10 
 median  39.68 39.48 40.60 1.12 -0.20  39.15 
IA premium (%) mean  5.15* 4.32 3.26 -1.06 -0.83  - 
 median  -0.95 -1.36 1.90 3.26 -0.41  - 
AMTBV mean  7.05 6.47 3.18 -3.28*** -0.58  6.52 
 median  2.89 3.16 2.52 -0.64*** 0.27*  2.43 
ATobin mean  2.64 2.94 1.78 -1.16*** 0.30  2.28 
 median  1.56 1.63 1.46 -0.17*** 0.07  1.46 
ARunUp (%) mean  20.42 14.32 17.95 3.63 -6.09  13.11 
 median  9.64 7.07 9.07 2.00 -2.57  8.01 
ADebt (%) mean  25.08 20.22 25.56 5.34*** -4.86***  25.24 
 median  22.66 17.96 21.35 3.39** -4.70***  22.03 
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Table IV. Pre- and Post-Turnover Acquisition CARs 
The table reports acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of M&As announced between 1989 and 2016 for i) 464 deals 
pertaining to 110 forced turnover events that meet the criteria described in Table I and Figure 1 and ii) 2,770 deals associated with 
a sample of 698 voluntary turnovers that fulfill exactly the same criteria. CEO successors for the forced and voluntary subsets have 
completed at least one control M&A deal of a public or private target valued $10 million or more where the deal relative size is 
equal to or larger than 1% within a 5-year post-turnover window. CARs are reported for a 3-day announcement window where 
parameters are estimated over a (-250,-15) window relative to the acquisition announcement day. Deals are partitioned in pre- and 
post-turnover. Panels A and B report acquisition gains for the forced and voluntary CEO turnover subgroups, respectively. In Panel 
A CARs are also partitioned by target type (public or private). Synergy gain is the market value-weighted CAR of the acquirer and 
the target where market values are measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Panel B reports the CARs for the 
voluntary turnover sample. Panel C reports control deal adjusted CARs for pre- and post-forced turnover deals. The control sample 
is described in Table III. CAR1 is the CAR less the median CAR of all control sample deals that took place in the same year and 
involve targets of the same industry and status (private or public). CAR2 is the CAR less the median CAR of all control sample 
deals with similar relative size (± 30%), completed within the same year and involve targets of the same status. CAR3 is the CAR 
less the median CAR of all control sample deals completed within the same year that involve the same payment method and targets 
of the same status. CAR4 is the CAR less the median CAR of all control sample deals of similar deal frequency (frequent vs 
infrequent deal makers), completed within the same year and targets of the same status. For CAR5 the last deal of a dismissed CEO 
is matched with similarly performing (±30%) deal from the voluntary and no-turnover samples. Then the corresponding first deal 
of the CEO successor is adjusted by the median performance of similar subsequent deals (in terms of method of payment and size) 
from the performance-based matched previously derived. CAR6 is adjusted by the performance of post-turnover deals in the 
voluntary turnover sample with similar average pre-turnover performance (±30%). t-test (for means) and signed rank test (for 
medians) are reported for columns (1) and (2). Post-Pre difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for 
medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Abnormal return measure        Target type 
(1) (2) (2) - (1) 
Pre-turnover 
CARs 
Post-turnover 
CARs 
Difference 
Panel A: Acquisition returns – Forced turnovers 
    CAR All  mean -0.88** 1.59*** 2.47*** 
  median -0.79*** 0.89*** 1.68*** 
  n 270 194 - 
 Public mean -3.53*** 0.59 4.12*** 
  median -2.92*** 0.54 3.46*** 
  n 101 59 - 
 Private mean 0.71 2.02*** 1.32* 
  median 0.23 1.14*** 0.91** 
  n 169 135 - 
Synergy gain All mean -0.76 2.05** 2.88** 
  median -0.77 1.29** 2.06** 
Panel B: Acquirer returns – Voluntary turnovers 
      CAR All  mean 0.77*** 0.34* -0.42 
  median 0.19** 0.12 -0.07 
  n 1,640 1,432 - 
Panel C: Control deal adjusted acquirer returns – Forced turnovers 
      CAR1 
All 
mean -1.01** 1.46*** 2.47*** 
Industry-Target-Year matched median -1.49*** 0.60** 2.09*** 
CAR2 
All 
mean -1.42*** 1.09* 2.51*** 
Size-Target-Year matched median -1.17*** 0.73 1.90*** 
CAR3 
All 
mean -0.80** 1.29** 2.10*** 
Payment-Target-Year matched median -0.93*** 0.55** 1.48*** 
CAR4  All mean -1.04** 1.22** 2.26*** 
Frequency-Target-Year matched  median -1.22*** 0.49* 1.71*** 
CAR5 All mean - 2.18*** - 
Mean reversion control   median - 0.73** - 
CAR6 
All 
mean - 2.80*** - 
Mean reversion control II median - 1.89*** - 
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Table V. Acquirer CAR Regressions 
The table reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of M&As 
announced between 1989 and 2016 on deal and acquirer characteristics for a sample of 3,537 acquisitions consummated within a 
5-year period preceding or following 110 forced and 698 voluntary CEO turnovers. The sample of CEO turnovers and M&A deals 
are described in Table IV. CARs are reported for a 3-day announcement window where parameters are estimated over a (-250,-15) 
window relative to the acquisition announcement day. Returns are winsorized using robust squared Mahalanobis distances. In 
specification 1 (2) the sample includes deals around forced (voluntary) CEO turnovers only, specification 3 includes only post 
turnover deals, while specifications 4 and 5 include all 3,537 deals. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deal is consummated 
by the successor CEO and zero otherwise. Forced is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deal is completed by the departed CEO 
prior to a forced turnover or the successor CEO following a forced turnover event and zero otherwise. Private is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the target is private and zero otherwise. The remaining explanatory variables are described in Table III. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. n is the number of observations and Adj. R2 (%) is the adjusted R-
square. p-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroskedasticity- and clustered-consistent 
standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) Forced 
(2) 
Voluntary 
(3) 
All post 
(4) 
All 
(5) 
All 
      
Intercept -0.029 0.084 0.029*** 0.082 0.080 
 0.524 0.250 0.007 0.267 0.278 
      
Post 0.030*** -0.002   -0.002 
 0.000 0.492   0.547 
Forced   0.014***  -0.010** 
   0.005  0.018 
Post x Forced     0.024*** 
     0.000 
ASize -0.003 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 0.146 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
RelSize  0.018 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 0.129 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Private 0.050*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cash 0.010 0.007*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 0.123 0.003 0.113 0.001 0.001 
Tender 0.037** 0.010 0.014 0.015** 0.015** 
 0.010 0.150 0.212 0.024 0.024 
Focus 0.014** 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 
 0.046 0.852 0.368 0.466 0.485 
AMTBV 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.147 0.274 0.504 0.149 0.137 
ARunUp -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
 0.349 0.688 0.126 0.577 0.529 
ADebt -0.023 0.008 -0.002 0.006 0.005 
 0.318 0.252 0.825 0.407 0.455 
Industry & Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
      
n 440 2,987 1,585 3,427 3,427 
Adj. R2 (%) 13.71 5.23 6.20 5.85 6.13 
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Table VI. Probit Regressions and Propensity Score Matched Acquisition Performance 
The table reports CEO successor acquisition performance adjusted using propensity scores that are estimated from probit 
regressions of the forced turnover likelihood on the departed CEO acquisition performance and other deal and CEO-level 
characteristics. The sample of turnovers includes 110 forced and 698 voluntary turnovers described in Table IV. The M&As sample 
is between 1989 and 2016. Panel A reports results from the probit estimation where the dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO 
was forced out and zero otherwise. MCAR (SCAR) is the average (aggregate) CAR of all acquisitions of the departed CEO. MStock 
is the average share of pure stock deals across all pre-turnover deals of a particular case. MRelSize is the average target-to-acquirer 
relative size across all pre-turnover deals of a particular case. The age (CEO age) and tenure (CEO tenure) of the CEO are measured 
in years. Pre-BHR(-3) and Post-BHR(+3) are buy-and-hold stock returns estimated over 3 years prior to and following the first 
deal of the departed CEO completed within a 5-year window preceding the turnover event. Panel B reports forced post-turnover 
acquirer returns (Treated sample) and propensity score matched returns from voluntary post-turnover deals (Control sample). 
Difference is the return differential between the Control and Treated samples. n is the number of observations and pseudo R2 (%) 
is the pseudo R-square. p-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroskedasticity- and clustered-
consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. For Panel B statistical 
significance is reported only for difference estimates. 
Panel A: Probit estimation results 
Forced=1   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept   -1.098*** 0.654 -1.101*** 0.667 
   0.000 0.117 0.000 0.107 
MCAR   -2.033*** -2.456**   
   0.005 0.040   
SCAR     -1.422*** -1.663** 
     0.002 0.038 
MStock    0.163  0.148 
    0.262  0.313 
MCAR x MStock    1.510   
    0.312   
SCAR x MStock      0.767 
      0.534 
CEO age    -0.031***  -0.031*** 
    0.000  0.000 
CEO tenure    -0.020  -0.021 
    0.186  0.167 
MRelSize    0.005  -0.003 
    0.965  0.979 
Pre-BHR(-3)    -0.347  -0.355 
    0.563  0.550 
Post-BHR(+3)    -3.450***  -3.398** 
    0.009  0.010 
n   808 709 808 709 
pseudo R2 (%)   1.14 9.19 1.41 9.52 
Panel B: Adjusted post-turnover CARs based on PSM  
   One-to-one 30 Nearest 50 Nearest Gaussian Kernel 
MCAR Treated  mean 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 
 Control mean -0.95 -0.16 -0.05 -1.09 
 Difference  2.23*** 1.44* 1.33 2.37*** 
SCAR Treated mean 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 
 Control  mean -0.70 -0.18 -0.95 -1.04 
 Difference  3.06** 2.54* 3.31* 3.40** 
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Table VII. Regressions of Post-to-Pre Turnover Acquisition Performance Change 
The table reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the post-minus-pre-turnover difference in acquirer CARs (ΔCAR) 
on board independence, ownership, CEO-level, and deal characteristics. In specifications 1-3 the dependent variable is the 
difference in average acquisition returns between the successor and predecessor CEO, ΔMCAR. In specifications 4-6 the dependent 
variable is the difference in aggregate acquisition returns between the successor and predecessor, ΔSCAR. CARs are calculated 
over the 3-day announcement window where the parameters are estimated over a (-250,-15) window relative to the announcement 
day. Returns are winsorized using robust squared Mahalanobis distances. The sample meets the criteria described in Table IV. BoD 
independence is the percentage of outside directors relative to the total directors siting on the board of the firm as reported in the 
proxy statement prior to the turnover announcement. The grouping of independent directors is based on the Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) classification. Outside blockholder is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a block of at least 5% of the company’s 
outstanding shares is held by a non-inside investor (institutional or other) as indicated in the last proxy statement prior to the 
turnover event. Hedge fund is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a block of at least 5% of the company’s outstanding 
shares is held by a hedge fund or private equity firm as indicated in the last proxy statement prior to the turnover event and identified 
using extensive web and news searches. ΔExperience is the difference in years of experience as chief executive between the new 
and departed CEOs. The CEO’s experience is based on information hand-collected from the Marquis Who’s Who database and 
complemented with searches in Forbes Profiles and Bloomberg Business Week (Executive Profiles). ΔAge is the age difference 
between two CEOs. ΔSalary is the difference in their total compensation, collected from SEC filings, scaled by total assets. 
Specialist successor is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO was previously employed by a company with the same business 
description and zero otherwise. ΔPrivateDeals is the difference in the ratios of private-to-total deals corresponding to the successor 
and departed CEOs. ΔSize is the difference in the logarithms of the average acquirer market capitalization between the deals of the 
successor and the departed CEO. ΔRelSize is the difference in transaction relative size between the deals of the successor and the 
departed CEO. ΔCashDeals is the difference in the ratios of pure-cash-to-total deals completed by the successor and the departed 
CEOs. ΔTender is the difference in tender offer-to-total deals of the new and old CEOs. ΔRunUp is the difference in average 
acquirer runup between all deals of the successor and departed CEO. ΔMTBV is the post-minus-pre-turnover difference in the 
firm’s average market-to-book value measured at the fiscal year end prior to the respective acquisition announcements. ΔDebt is 
the difference in the average debt-ratio (long-term and short-term interest bearing debt over total assets) between deals carried out 
by the successor and departed CEOs where the debt ratio is measured at the fiscal year end prior to each acquisition announcement. 
n is the number of observations and Adj. R2 (%) is the adjusted R-square. p-values are reported below regression estimates and are 
calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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 (1) 
ΔMCAR 
(2) 
ΔMCAR 
(3) 
ΔMCAR 
(4) 
ΔSCAR 
(5) 
ΔSCAR 
(6) 
ΔSCAR 
Intercept -0.033 -0.032 -0.055* -0.036 -0.047 -0.069 
 0.256 0.250 0.052 0.412 0.290 0.172 
BoD and ownership       
BoD independence 0.080** 0.087** 0.087** 0.128* 0.153** 0.138** 
 0.048 0.034 0.030 0.051 0.023 0.045 
Outside blockholder   0.004   0.001 
   0.795   0.967 
Hedge fund    0.034**   0.050** 
   0.013   0.031 
CEO characteristics       
ΔExperience  0.001* 0.001*  0.003* 0.003* 
  0.082 0.053  0.070 0.057 
ΔAge  0.040 0.034  0.050 0.049 
  0.179 0.278  0.368 0.372 
ΔSalary  -0.269 -0.354  -0.193 -0.247 
  0.488 0.403  0.782 0.761 
Specialist successor  -0.006 -0.000  -0.010 -0.009 
  0.704 0.999  0.744 0.733 
Deal and acquirer controls       
ΔPrivateDeals 0.038** 0.036** 0.033** 0.045* 0.042 0.036 
 0.014 0.022 0.024 0.066 0.107 0.149 
ΔSize 0.011 0.013* 0.023*** 0.023* 0.020 0.035*** 
 0.138 0.096 0.004 0.073 0.143 0.007 
ΔRelSize 0.020 0.023 0.033** 0.050*** 0.047** 0.055*** 
 0.170 0.124 0.010 0.006 0.015 0.005 
ΔCashDeals 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 
 0.953 0.744 0.965 0.793 0.940 0.926 
ΔTender 0.052 0.047 0.030 0.028 0.014 -0.005 
 0.161 0.188 0.388 0.651 0.802 0.926 
ΔRunUp -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.014 
 0.784 0.858 0.579 0.935 0.693 0.199 
ΔMTBV   -0.003***   -0.004** 
   0.008   0.041 
ΔDebt   -0.020   0.072 
   0.550   0.301 
n 107 105 99 107 105 99 
Adj. R2 (%) 8.57 11.42 21.23 5.65 6.89 15.67 
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Table VIII. Acquirer Long-Run Acquisition Performance Regressions 
The table reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of acquirer long-run acquisition performance of M&As announced 
between 1989 and 2016 on deal and acquirer characteristics for a sample of 3,537 acquisitions consummated within a 5-year period 
preceding or following 110 forced and 698 voluntary CEO Turnovers. The sample of CEO turnovers and M&A deals are described 
in Table IV. Panel A reports the long-run post-acquisition stock performance regressions. The dependent variable in specifications 
1 and 2 (3 and 4) is the 12 (24)-month buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). BHARs are estimated as 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 =
∏ �1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 − ∏ �1 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 , where Ri,t is the return of acquirer i at month t, RBenchmark,t is the return of the 
corresponding benchmark, and T is the number of months. The benchmark is the return of the corresponding 25 size- and book-to-
market reference portfolio for the same month t. Panel B reports post-acquisition operating performance regressions. Similar to 
Healy, et al. (1992) in specifications 1 and 2 (3 and 4) the main dependent variable is the 3 (5)-year mean industry-adjusted post-
acquisition operating performance (AROA). Operating performance (ROA) is operating income (before depreciation) scaled by 
total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the acquisition announcement. Pre - AROA is the mean industry-adjusted pre-acquisition 
performance estimated over 3 years (specifications 1 and 2) or 5 years (specifications 3 and 4) prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deal is consummated by the successor CEO and zero otherwise. Forced 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deal is completed by the departed CEO prior to a forced turnover or the successor CEO 
following a forced turnover event and zero otherwise. Controls refers to the same control variables as in Table V. n is the number 
of observations and Adj. R2 (%) is the adjusted R-square. p-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Long-run stock performance (BHAR) 
 (1) 12 months 
(2) 
12 months 
(3) 
24 months 
(4) 
24 months 
     
Intercept 0.001 0.044 -0.001 0.012 
 0.645 0.127 0.468 0.375 
     
Post -0.005** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.004** 
 0.019 0.004 0.397 0.041 
Forced -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.002 
Post x Forced 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
n 3,378 3,272 3,378 3,272 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.62 1.18 1.30 1.88 
Panel B: Operating performance (AROA) 
 (1) 
3 years 
(2) 
3 years 
(3) 
5 years 
(4) 
5 years 
     
Intercept 0.022*** 0.022 0.023*** -0.013 
 0.000 0.703 0.000 0.776 
     
Pre - AROA 0.436*** 0.418*** 0.378*** 0.342*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post -0.013*** -0.008* -0.014*** -0.008* 
 0.004 0.088 0.003 0.080 
Forced -0.017** -0.024*** -0.017** -0.024*** 
 0.041 0.003 0.047 0.002 
Post x Forced 0.025** 0.028** 0.025** 0.029*** 
 0.029 0.013 0.035 0.009 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
n 3,095 2,999 3,102 3,006 
Adj. R2 (%) 27.91 35.61 21.78 30.92 
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Table IX. Total New Investment Efficiency of CEOs for the Forced Turnover Sample 
The table reports coefficients from regressions of total new investment of successor and departed CEOs following forced turnovers 
in our sample. The sample meets the criteria described in Table I. Columns 1 and 2 contain cases with all 226 CEOs (both with 
acquisitive and non-acquisitive successors) whereas columns 3 and 4 only contain cases with 116 non-acquisitive CEO successors. 
Panel A shows the firm/year regressions for the total new investments. Similar to Richardson (2006), the dependent variable is 
total new investment, INV, which is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions minus sales of PPE and 
necessary maintenance for assets in place for firm i in year t or t-1, scaled by prior-year book value of total assets. Q is the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by book value of total assets for firm i 
in year t. Leverage is the total debt (long- and short-term) divided by book value of total assets for firm i in year t-1. Cash is the 
cash and short-term investments divided by book value of total assets for firm i in year t-1. Age is the logarithm of the number of 
years firm i has been listed on CRSP. Size is the logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t-1. Stock Returns is the change in the 
market value of firm i between year t and t-1. We trace CEOs investments over a 5-year period for both successor and departed 
CEOs. Accounting variables are from Compustat and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to remove outliers. Panel B reports the 
inefficient investment result, INEFFINV, which is the absolute value of the residuals from the regression INVi,t = α + β1 Qi,t-1 + 
β2 Leveragei,t-1 + β3 Cashi,t-1 + β4 Agei,t-1 + β5 Sizei,t-1 + β6 Stock Returnsi,t-1 + β7 INVi,t-1 + FE + εi in Panel A. n is the number of 
observations and Adj. R2 (%) is the adjusted R-square. p-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Total new investment regressions (INVi,t) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  With acquisitive and  non-acquisitive successors With non-acquisitive successors 
      Intercept  0.004 0.015 -0.014 0.023 
  0.868 0.843 0.756 0.836 
      Qi, t-1  0.008** 0.010* 0.013* 0.018* 
  0.040 0.080 0.069 0.050 
Leveragei,t-1  -0.050*** -0.139*** -0.027 -0.137** 
  0.001 0.000 0.173 0.020 
Cash i,t-1  0.063** 0.091* 0.020 0.012 
  0.035 0.062 0.687 0.857 
Age i,t-1  0.009 0.032 0.006 0.043 
  0.197 0.123 0.419 0.112 
Size i,t-1  -0.005** -0.008 -0.005** -0.019 
  0.017 0.335 0.031 0.106 
Stock Returns i,t-1  -0.004** -0.002 -0.004* -0.001 
  0.026 0.125 0.052 0.398 
INVi,t-1  1.312*** 1.052*** 1.354*** 1.048*** 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      Industry & Year FE  NO YES NO YES 
n  1,456 1,456 668 668 
Adj. R2 (%)  69.69 50.66 73.07 54.64 
Panel B: Inefficient investment of CEOs (INEFFINV) 
  (1) All CEOs 
(2) 
Departed 
(3) 
Successors 
(3) – (2) 
Difference 
With acquisitive and mean 0.085 0.095 0.074 -0.021*** 
non-acquisitive successors     0.000 
 median 0.056 0.065 0.050 -0.014*** 
     0.001 
 n 1,456 748 708  
      
With non-acquisitive mean 0.095 0.110 0.076 -0.035*** 
successors     0.000 
 median 0.069 0.082 0.060 -0.022*** 
     0.001 
 n 668 382 286  
 49 
 
Table X. Divestment Analysis 
The table reports divestment information for a sample of 226 firms with forced CEO turnovers that fulfill the criteria described in Table I and Table III. The divestiture sample 
consists of 152 completed divestitures where the transaction value of the divestment to the size of the divesting firm is equal to or greater than 1%. Statistics are reported for a 5-year 
pre-and post-turnover period related to departed and successor CEOs, respectively. The group labelled With Acquisitive Successor comprises of 110 cases where the departed CEO 
is subsequently replaced by a new CEO that completes acquisition investments (Acquisitive successor). The subset labelled With Non-acquisitive Successor comprises of 116 cases 
where the departed CEOs is subsequently replaced by a new CEO that does not consummate acquisition investments (Non-acquisitive successors). Both subsets are illustrated in 
Figure 1 Panel A reports statistics at the deal level. Acquisitions (Divestitures) is the number of acquisitions (divestitures) in the sample. Divestitures share (%) is the ratio of the 
number of divestitures to total acquisitions and divestitures. Acquisition (Divestiture) deal value is the dollar value of acquisitions (divestitures). Divestitures value share (%) is the 
share of value in divestitures over total value of both divestitures and acquisitions. Divestment CAR (%) is the divesting-firm’s cumulative abnormal return over the 3-day 
announcement window where the parameters are estimated over the period (-250,-15) relative to the announcement day of the divestiture. Panel B reports statistics at the turnover 
case level. Turnover cases is the number of cases where a CEO was replaced by the firm involuntarily. Turnover cases with divestitures is the number of incidences where a CEO 
completed at least one divestiture. Divestitures case share (%) is the ratio of divestiture cases to total turnover cases. Core business divestment (%) is the percentage of cases where 
the divestiture involves a core business activity. Core business divestments have the same 2-digit SIC code as the firm. Discontinued operations share (%) is the ratio of cases with 
discontinued operations to total turnover cases. Discontinued operations is the item DO in Compustat and is reported when a firm reports any income or loss from discontinued 
operations. Years with discontinued operations is the number of fiscal years where the company reported income or loss from discontinued operations for a maximum of five years 
around the turnover event. t-test (for means) and signed rank test (for medians) are only reported for Divestment CAR. Difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-
test for medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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  Departed CEO  Successor CEO Successor-Departed CEO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (4)-(1) (5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
  All 
With 
acquisitive 
successor 
With non-
acquisitive 
successor 
All Acquisitive  Non-acquisitive    
Panel A: Deal level           
Acquisitions n 539 270 269 194 194 0 - - - 
Divestitures n 78 52 26 74 36 38 - - - 
Divestitures share (%) mean 12.64 16.15 8.81 27.61 15.65 - 14.97*** -0.50 - 
Acquisition deal value ($mil) sum 622,341 388,414 233,927 171,539 171,539 - - - - 
 mean 1,155 1,439 870 884 884 - -270 -554 - 
Divestiture deal value ($mil) sum 42,886 35,387 7,499 41,668 11,537 30,130 - - - 
 mean 550 681 288 563 321 793 13 -360 505 
Divestitures value share (%)  % 6.47 8.35 3.11 19.54 6.30 - - - - 
Divestment CAR (%) mean 0.35 0..38 0.31 5.68*** 3.70*** 7.61*** 5.33*** 3.32** 7.29** 
 median 0.04 0.35 -0.09 2.52*** 2.13*** 2.56*** 2.48*** 1.78** 2.47*** 
Panel B: Turnover case level          
Turnover cases n 226 110 116 226 110 116 - - - 
Turnover cases with divestitures n 44 25 19 51 25 26 - - - 
Divestitures case share (%) mean 19.47 22.73 16.38 22.57 22.73 22.41 3.10 0.00 6.03 
Core business divestment (%) mean 47.20 51.07 42.11 62.91 71.00 55.13 15.71 19.93 13.02 
Discontinued operations share (%)  
 
mean 21.33 22.94 19.83 49.75 50.91 48.35 28.42*** 27.97*** 28.52*** 
Years with discontinued operations mean 0.44 0.43 0.38 1.29 1.46 1.09 0.89*** 1.03*** 0.71*** 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A.1. Departed and Successor CEO Acquisition Performance Comparison at Turnover Case Level 
The table reports acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a sample of 110 forced CEO turnover events. The CEO turnover 
sample and the CAR estimation are described in Table I and Table IV. Panel A reports the CARs for both departed and successor 
CEO for different measures. Pre- (Post-) turnover deals correspond to deals made by the departed (successor) CEO. First is the 
first acquisition of the CEO in the pre- or post-turnover period. Last is the last acquisition of the departed CEO. If a given CEO 
has completed only one deal then this is included in both the First and Last subsets. Mean (Sum) is the average (aggregate) CAR 
of all acquisitions of the CEO in the pre- or post-turnover period. CAR1-6 are control deal adjusted CARs described in Table IV. 
Panel B reports the CARs differentials between departed and successor CEOs for different measures. t-test (for means) and signed 
rank test (for medians) are reported for columns (1) to (7). Difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for 
medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Departed and successor CEO CARs 
Abnormal return measure Pre-turnover deals Post-turnover deals 
  (1) First 
(2) 
Last 
(3) 
Mean 
(4) 
Sum 
(5) 
First 
(6) 
Mean 
(7) 
Sum 
CAR mean -0.78 -1.41** -1.08** -2.15** 2.19*** 1.37** 2.80*** 
 median -0.60 -0.85** -0.92*** -1.91*** 0.70** 0.12* 0.12* 
CAR1 mean -1.07 -1.45** -1.20** -2.48*** 1.97** 1.18* 2.57** 
 median -1.70* -1.85*** -1.57*** -2.42*** 0.43 0.05 0.15 
CAR2 mean -1.11 -1.71** -1.62*** -3.47*** 1.76** 0.97 1.92* 
 median -1.28** -1.79*** -1.99*** -4.24*** 0.73 0.37 0.61 
CAR3 mean -0.73 -1.22* -0.92* -1.96** 1.95** 1.06* 2.28** 
 median -0.50* -0.93** -1.03*** -2.54*** 0.69* 0.23 0.27 
CAR4 mean -1.54** -1.56** -1.42*** -2.55*** 1.52* 0.88 2.15** 
 median -1.82*** -1.61*** -1.37*** -3.11*** 0.30 0.01 0.01 
CAR5 mean - - - - 2.18*** - - 
 median - - - - 0.73** - - 
CAR6 mean - - - - 2.83*** 1.94*** 4.93*** 
 median - - - - 1.28*** 1.20** 1.30*** 
Panel B: CAR differences 
 
(5) - (1) 
First- 
First 
(5) - (2) 
First- 
Last 
(6) - (3) 
Mean-Mean 
(6) - (2) 
Mean- 
Last 
(5) - (3) 
First- 
Mean 
(7) - (4) 
Sum- 
Sum 
CAR mean 2.98*** 3.60*** 2.45*** 2.78*** 3.27*** 4.96*** 
 median 2.27*** 2.56*** 1.76*** 2.14*** 2.59*** 4.97*** 
CAR1 mean 3.04*** 3.42*** 2.37*** 2.63*** 3.17*** 5.05*** 
 median 2.32*** 2.88*** 2.24*** 2.29*** 2.47*** 3.94*** 
CAR2 mean 2.87*** 3.47*** 2.58*** 2.67*** 3.38*** 5.40*** 
 median 1.72*** 2.41*** 2.93*** 2.11*** 2.59*** 5.72*** 
CAR3 mean 2.69*** 3.17*** 1.98*** 2.28*** 2.88*** 4.24*** 
 median 2.25*** 2.66*** 1.61*** 1.92*** 2.20*** 3.79*** 
CAR4 mean 3.07*** 3.08*** 2.29*** 2.43*** 2.94*** 4.70*** 
 median 2.16*** 1.92*** 1.58*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 3.89*** 
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Table A.2. Correlations among Independent Variables 
The table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for the independent variables used for the regression in Table VII. The sample comprises 110 forced turnover events that 
satisfy the criteria described in Table I and Table IV. BoD independence is the percentage of outside directors relative to the total directors siting on the board of the firm as reported 
in the proxy statement prior to the turnover announcement. The grouping of independent directors is based on the Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) classification. Outside blockholder 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a block of at least 5% of the company’s outstanding shares is held by a non-inside investor (institutional or other) as indicated in 
the last proxy statement prior to the turnover event. Hedge fund is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a block of at least 5% of the company’s outstanding shares is held 
by a Hedge Fund or Private Equity Firm as indicated in the last proxy statement prior to the turnover event and identified using extensive web and news searches. ΔExperience is 
the difference in years of experience as chief executive between the new and departed CEOs. The CEO’s experience is based on information hand-collected from the Marquis Who’s 
Who database and complemented with searches in Forbes Profiles and Bloomberg Business Week (Executive Profiles). ΔAge is the age difference between two CEOs. ΔSalary is 
the difference in their total compensation, collected from SEC filings, scaled by total assets. Specialist successor is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO was previously 
employed by a company with the same business description and zero otherwise. ΔPrivateDeals is the difference in the ratios of private-to-total deals corresponding to the successor 
and departed CEOs. ΔSize is the difference in the logarithms of the average acquirer market capitalization between the deals of the successor and the departed CEO. ΔRelSize is the 
difference in transaction relative size between the deals of the successor and the departed CEO. ΔCashDeals is the difference in the ratios of pure-cash-to-total deals completed by 
the successor and the departed CEOs. ΔTender is the difference in tender offer-to-total deals of the new and old CEOs. ΔRunUp is the difference in average acquirer runup between 
all deals of the successor and departed CEO. ΔMTBV is the post- minus pre-turnover difference in the firm’s average market-to-book value measured at the fiscal year end prior to 
the respective acquisition announcements. ΔDebt is the difference in the average debt-ratio (long-term and short-term interest bearing debt over total assets) between deals carried 
out by the successor and departed CEOs where the debt ratio is measured at the fiscal year end prior to each acquisition announcement. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Variables BoD independence 
Outside 
blockholder  
Hedge 
fund ΔExperience ΔAge ΔSalary 
Specialist 
successor 
ΔPrivate 
Deals ΔSize 
BoD independence 1.000         
Outside blockholder -0.072 1.000        
Hedge fund 0.194 0.364 1.000       
ΔExperience -0.033 -0.068 -0.063 1.000      
ΔAge -0.072 -0.169 -0.039 0.139 1.000     
ΔSalary 0.070 0.043 0.050 0.044 0.034 1.000    
Specialist successor 0.074 -0.036 -0.083 0.106 0.023 -0.126 1.000   
ΔPrivateDeals 0.053 0.060 0.152 0.042 -0.007 0.155 0.112 1.000  
ΔSize 0.022 0.047 0.083 0.096 -0.067 -0.007 0.209 -0.090 1.000 
ΔRelSize 0.048 0.102 -0.129 -0.025 -0.078 -0.053 -0.152 -0.151 -0.515 
ΔCashDeals 0.044 0.012 0.004 -0.082 -0.062 0.014 0.002 0.095 0.091 
ΔTender 0.043 0.001 0.030 0.246 -0.049 0.152 -0.061 -0.304 0.123 
ΔRunUp -0.033 -0.100 -0.121 -0.083 -0.119 -0.161 -0.107 -0.118 -0.055 
ΔMTBV 0.132 -0.004 0.163 -0.042 -0.086 -0.123 -0.042 0.025 0.227 
ΔDebt 0.066 0.111 -0.022 -0.026 -0.030 -0.124 0.036 0.086 -0.208 
Variables ΔRelSize ΔCashDeals ΔTender ΔRunUp ΔMTBV ΔDebt    
ΔRelSize 1.000         
ΔCashDeals -0.057 1.000        
ΔTender 0.017 -0.026 1.000       
ΔRunUp 0.243 -0.017 0.026 1.000      
ΔMTBV -0.014 -0.072 -0.069 0.073 1.000     
ΔDebt 0.190 -0.021 -0.081 0.047 -0.063 1.000    
 
